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Abstract 
This paper studies the origins and consequences of international technology gaps. I develop an 
endogenous growth model where R&D efficiency varies across countries and productivity differences 
emerge from firm-level technology investments. The theory characterizes how innovation and 
learning determine technology gaps, trade and global income inequality. Countries with higher R&D 
efficiency are richer and have comparative advantage in more innovation-dependent industries where 
the advantage of backwardness is lower and knowledge spillovers are more localized. I estimate R&D 
efficiency by country and innovation-dependence by industry from R&D and bilateral trade data. 
Calibrating the model implies technology gaps, due to cross-country differences in R&D efficiency, 
account for around one-quarter to one-third of nominal wage variation within the OECD. 
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1 Introduction
International productivity differences lead to variation in living standards (Caselli 2005) and determine
Ricardian comparative advantage and the pattern of trade (Ricardo 1817; Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson
1977; Eaton and Kortum 2002; Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer 2012). Productivity differences may
result either from variation in the efficiency with which technologies and factor inputs are utilised (Acemoglu
and Zilibotti 2001; Hsieh and Klenow 2009) or from technology gaps that occur when countries have access
to different production technologies. This paper studies technology gaps. What determines the size of
international technology gaps? How do technology gaps differ across industries? And how important are
technology gaps in explaining international variation in wages and incomes?
Technology gaps arise because some countries are more innovative than others. Nelson (1993) describes
how differences in the institutions and infrastructure that support knowledge creation, which he terms the
“national innovation system”, lead to large differences in innovative performance. Or, as Ohlin (1933,
p.86) puts it “Nations vary much in inventive ability”. For example, in 2015 the US and Japan together
produced 30% of world GDP, but accounted for 47% of applications filed under the World Intellectual
Property Organization’s Patent Cooperation Treaty.1
But innovation is not the only source of technological improvements. Firms that are behind the technol-
ogy frontier can raise their productivity by learning about and adopting existing technologies. Consequently,
technology gaps also depend upon the rate at which ideas diffuse within countries (Lucas and Moll 2014;
Perla and Tonetti 2014) and, in open economies, upon international knowledge diffusion (Grossman and
Helpman 1991; Parente and Prescott 1994; Barro and Sala-i-Martı´n 1997; Eaton and Kortum 1999; Howitt
2000; Klenow and Rodrı´guez-Clare 2005; Buera and Oberfield 2016). If diffusion is fast, the gap between
innovators and imitators will be small, whereas slow diffusion will increase the advantage that accrues to
knowledge creators.
To understand the origins and consequences of technology gaps, this paper develops a model of how
innovation and learning jointly shape the international productivity distribution. Crucially, I allow the inno-
vation and learning technologies to differ across sectors. Consequently, differences in national innovation
systems generate comparative advantage. This has two implications. First, the model gives a new theory of
1Patent application data obtained from http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2016/article_
0002.html on 27 September 2016. GDP shares at market exchange rates calculated from the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators.
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the origins of Ricardian comparative advantage in which productivity differences arise endogenously from
firm-level technology investments. Second, trade data can be used to estimate the parameters that determine
the size of international technology gaps. Using these estimates to calibrate the model, the paper quanti-
fies how differences in national innovation systems affect wages and income levels. This provides a novel
method for addressing the importance of innovation in explaining international variation in living standards.
The theory has three key components, which are introduced in Section 2. First, the efficiency of R&D
varies across countries due to differences in national innovation systems. Countries with better national in-
novation systems have absolute advantages in R&D. Second, firms choose whether to upgrade their produc-
tivity through innovative R&D or through technology adoption (Benhabib, Perla and Tonetti 2014; Ko¨nig,
Lorenz and Zilibotti 2016). Firms are heterogeneous in their R&D capabilities and, in equilibrium, there
exists a capability threshold above which firms select into R&D. The threshold is lower in countries with
higher R&D efficiency.
Third, there are knowledge spillovers within and across countries. Knowledge is used as an input for
both R&D and technology adoption and the knowledge level in each country is an average of the domestic
productivity frontier and global knowledge capital. The weight given to the domestic frontier determines
the localization of knowledge spillovers. There is also an advantage of backwardness that increases the effi-
ciency of technology investment for less productive firms, regardless of whether they choose R&D or adop-
tion (Gerschenkron 1962; Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen 2004). I assume all knowledge spillovers occur
within industries and allow both the localization of knowledge spillovers and the advantage of backward-
ness to be industry-specific. Peri (2005), Acharya and Keller (2009) and Malerba, Mancusi and Montobbio
(2013) show that the impact of international borders on knowledge flows varies by sector. Doraszelski and
Jaumandreu (2013) find that the effect of current productivity on future productivity growth, conditional on
R&D investment, differs across industries.
Because of international knowledge spillovers and the advantage of backwardness, on a balanced growth
path technology gaps (i.e. relative productivity levels) are stable, both between domestic firms and across
countries. Section 3 characterizes balanced growth in a global economy with many countries and industries
and studies the equilibrium intranational and international technology gaps. Unsurprisingly, countries with
higher R&D efficiency are more productive and richer. Likewise, within country-industry pairs, firms that
perform R&D are more productive than those that upgrade productivity through technology adoption and
productivity is increasing in R&D capability among innovative firms.
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However, the degree of productivity dispersion is endogenous and industry-specific. The model shows
how the size of equilibrium technology gaps is determined by the relative strengths of the dispersion and
concentration forces in the global economy. The dispersion force results from local knowledge spillovers
and differences in R&D efficiency between countries and R&D capability across firms. The concentration
force comes from global knowledge spillovers and the advantage of backwardness. Within countries, a
greater advantage of backwardness strengthens the concentration force and reduces productivity dispersion.
Across countries, not only is this effect present, but the localization of knowledge spillovers also plays a
role. More localized spillovers magnify the advantage of firms in more productive countries and strengthen
the dispersion force. I show that industries can be characterized by their innovation-dependence, which
is decreasing in the advantage of backwardness and increasing in the localization of knowledge spillovers.
On any balanced growth path, technology gaps are greater in more innovation-dependent industries. Con-
sequently, countries with higher R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage in industries with a lower
advantage of backwardness and more localized knowledge spillovers.
While cross-industry variation in innovation-dependence determines the pattern of comparative advan-
tage, the level of innovation-dependence affects the size of aggregate wage and income gaps. In the simple
case with no trade costs, the elasticity of wages to R&D efficiency is proportional to a weighted average
of industries’ innovation-dependence levels. With trade costs, the relationship is more complex, but the
intuition is the same: when industries are more innovation-dependent, countries with higher R&D efficiency
have a greater technological advantage and this leads to larger gaps in wages and income per capita.
To illustrate the empirical applicability of the theory, Section 4 estimates and calibrates a first-order
approximation to the model using data on 25 OECD economies. There are two key sets of parameters that I
obtain using the structure of the model: country R&D efficiency levels and industry innovation-dependences.
Because the threshold for selection into R&D is decreasing in R&D efficiency, the ratio of R&D expenditure
to value-added at the industry level is larger in countries with higher R&D efficiency. Using this relationship,
I infer R&D efficiency from cross-country, within-industry variation in R&D intensity.
Given R&D efficiency, I estimate innovation-dependence for 22 goods industries using the trade equa-
tion implied by the model. Innovation-dependence is estimated to be positive and significant in all industries
except Mining, where it is insignificantly different from zero. It is largest in the Computers, Electrical equip-
ment and Chemicals industries and smallest in the Petroleum, Agriculture, Food and Wood industries. The
estimates imply that moving from the 25th to the 75th percentile of the R&D efficiency distribution in-
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creases a country’s exports by 57% more for an industry at the 75th percentile of the innovation-dependence
distribution than for an industry at the 25th percentile.
I use the calibrated model to quantify the extent to which R&D efficiency can account for cross-country
differences in wages and incomes. Development accounting studies show that productivity differences are a
major determinant of international variation in income per capita (Caselli 2005) and recent work finds that
misallocation is a quantitatively important source of productivity differences (Hsieh and Klenow 2009). I
assess the quantitative relevance of an alternative cause of productivity variation, namely that more innova-
tive countries have access to better technologies. I find that R&D efficiency differences account for around
one-quarter to one-third of observed variation in nominal wages within the OECD. Assuming innovation-
dependence is zero in the services sector, the model also implies that R&D efficiency accounts for around
one-sixth of observed income per capita variation. These results provide new evidence on how technology
gaps, caused by differences in R&D efficiency, contribute to wage and income differences across OECD
countries.
The calibration builds upon a small existing quantitative literature on R&D and international knowledge
diffusion. Parente and Prescott (1994) calibrate a single industry exogenous growth model and argue that
observed income disparities could be explained by plausible cross-country differences in the research tech-
nology, which they label barriers to technology adoption. Likewise, Klenow and Rodrı´guez-Clare (2005)
show quantitatively that variation in R&D investment may be sufficient to generate observed international
productivity gaps. They also hypothesize that differences in R&D investment rates are caused by policies
and institutions that affect R&D costs or returns. Using a directed technical change model, Gancia, Mu¨ller
and Zilibotti (2013) estimate the barriers to adoption needed to fit cross-country output differences and find
that if all countries used frontier technologies then GDP per worker of the average OECD economy relative
to the US would increase from 0.68 to 0.91. Relative to these studies, this paper’s empirical contribution is
to show how R&D efficiency and innovation-dependence can be estimated from R&D and trade data with-
out using information on income differences, and to quantify the share of international wage and income
variation attributable to technology gaps resulting from differences in R&D efficiency.
Eaton and Kortum (1999) estimate a model of innovation and diffusion in five leading research countries
and quantify the degree of international technology diffusion. More recently, Buera and Oberfield (2016)
incorporate diffusion into the trade theory of Bernard et al. (2003) and calibrate the model to examine
how changes in trade costs affect productivity. These papers shed light on the extent and effects of inter-
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national diffusion, but do not address comparative advantage or the consequences of differences in national
innovation systems.
The theory developed in this paper contributes to several strands of the trade and growth literatures. Ex-
isting dynamic models analyze how innovation determines comparative advantage in high-tech production
(Grossman 1990; Grossman and Helpman 1991, chs.7-8). Yet innovation is highly concentrated in a few
advanced countries and, within countries, at a few high productivity firms. For most firms, and throughout
much of the world, learning also contributes to productivity growth. I study how innovation and learning
jointly shape comparative advantage and identify the importance of the advantage of backwardness and the
localization of knowledge spillovers in determining an industry’s innovation-dependence.
Analysis of innovation and the pattern of trade in endogenous growth models can also be found in
Grossman and Helpman (1990), Taylor (1993) and Durkin Jr. (1997). In these studies exogenous variation
in the productivity of R&D relative to output production determines comparative advantage. Similarly,
Somale (2016) and Cai, Li and Santacreu (2019) study trade liberalization in many industry versions of
Eaton and Kortum (2001) where comparative advantage in production is shaped by exogenous comparative
advantage in innovation. Unlike these papers, I do not assume any exogenous variation in comparative
advantage across countries.
Learning and imitation shape trade flows in product cycle models, but the product cycle literature fo-
cuses on intraindustry trade (Vernon 1966; Krugman 1979; Grossman and Helpman 1991, chs.11-12).2
Likewise, learning plays an important role in recent work that incorporates firm heterogeneity into open
economy growth models (Perla, Tonetti and Waugh 2015; Impullitti and Licandro 2016; Sampson 2016a;
Akcigit, Ates and Impullitti 2018) and in studies of the relationship between technology diffusion, growth
and the spatial distribution of economic activity (Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg 2014; Desmet, Nagy and
Rossi-Hansberg 2016). However, none of these papers analyze comparative advantage. Learning-by-doing
models show how initial conditions can shape long-run comparative advantage in the presence of within-
country, within-industry knowledge spillovers (Krugman 1987; Redding 1999). In contrast to the learning-
by-doing literature, in this paper the existence of global knowledge spillovers implies steady state compara-
tive advantage is not path dependent.
The methodology I use to estimate innovation-dependence from bilateral trade data is related to empiri-
2A notable exception is Lu (2007) who use a quality ladder product cycle model to study how interindustry variation in the size
of the quality step determines North-South comparative advantage.
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cal studies of comparative advantage that interact country and industry characteristics (Romalis 2004; Nunn
2007; Chor 2010; Manova 2013) and to work by Hanson, Lind and Muendler (2013) and Levchenko and
Zhang (2016) that uses structural gravity models to infer productivity differences from trade flows. Hanson,
Lind and Muendler (2013) and Levchenko and Zhang (2016) analyze how the pattern of comparative advan-
tage changes over time, while remaining agnostic about mechanisms, whereas this paper provides a theory
and quantification of cross-sectional variation in steady state technology gaps. An alternative approach
to measuring international technology differences is to use data on the adoption of specific technologies
(Caselli and Coleman 2001; Comin, Hobijn and Rovito 2009; Comin and Mestieri 2018). Consistent with
this paper, such studies find that the rate at which new technologies are adopted differs greatly across coun-
tries and is strongly positively correlated with GDP per capita.
In addition to shedding new light on the origins of comparative advantage, the theory also makes a
methodological contribution to the endogenous growth literature by developing a new model where growth
results from technology investment by incumbent firms. Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2001) and Garcia-
Macia, Hsieh and Klenow (2015) estimate that most growth in US manufacturing comes from incumbent
firms, rather than creative destruction or the introduction of new varieties. This paper’s model of incumbent
firm R&D complements recent work on incumbent innovation and imitation in closed economy, quality
ladder models (Klette and Kortum 2004; Akcigit and Kerr 2016; Ko¨nig, Lorenz and Zilibotti 2016) and in
symmetric country trade models (Atkeson and Burstein 2010; Perla, Tonetti and Waugh 2015). An appeal-
ing feature of the framework is that it remains tractable even with many industries and many asymmetric
countries. This tractability facilitates estimation and calibration of the model.
2 A Model of the Global Productivity Distribution
The global economy comprises S countries indexed by s. Time t is continuous and all markets are compet-
itive. All parameters are assumed to be time invariant.
2.1 Preferences
Let Ls be the population of country s and assume there is no population growth. Within each country all
individuals are identical and have intertemporal preferences given by:
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U(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−ρ(t˜−t) log c(t˜)dt˜,
where ρ > 0 is the discount rate and c denotes consumption per capita. With these preferences the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution equals one. Individuals can lend or borrow at interest rate ιs. An individual
in country s with initial assets a(t) chooses a consumption path to maximize utility subject to the budget
constraint:
a˙(t) = ιs(t)a(t) + ws(t)− zs(t)c(t), (1)
where ws is the wage and zs is the consumption price in country s.
Solving the individual’s intertemporal optimization problem gives the Euler equation:
c˙
c
= ιs − ρ−
z˙s
zs
, (2)
where to simplify notation I have suppressed the dependence of the endogenous variables on time. For the
remainder of the paper I will not write variables as an explicit function of time unless it is necessary to avoid
confusion. Since all agents within a country are identical, we can write per capita consumption and assets
as country-specific variables cs and as, respectively. Aggregate consumption in country s is csLs and the
aggregate value of asset holdings equals asLs. The transversality condition for intertemporal optimization
in country s is:
lim
t˜→∞
{
as(t˜) exp
[
−
∫ t˜
t
ιs(tˆ)dtˆ
]}
= 0. (3)
There are J industries, indexed by j. Consumer demand is Cobb-Douglas across industries and within
industries output is differentiated by country of origin following Armington (1969). To be specific, aggregate
consumption in country s is given by:
csLs =
J∏
j=1
(
Xjs
µj
)µj
, with
J∑
j=1
µj = 1,
where Xjs denotes consumption of industry j output in country s and µj equals the share of industry j in
consumption expenditure. Let xjs˜s be industry j output from country s˜ that is consumed in country s. Then:
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Xjs =
(
S∑
s˜=1
x
σ−1
σ
js˜s
) σ
σ−1
,
where σ > 1 is the Armington elasticity.
There are iceberg trade costs τjs˜s of shipping industry j output from country s˜ to country s. This implies
that, if pjs˜ is the price received by producers in country s˜, then the price in country s is τjs˜spjs˜. Solving
consumers’ intratemporal optimization problem yields:
PjsXjs = µjzscsLs, (4)
zs =
J∏
j=1
P
µj
js , (5)
xjs˜s =
(
τjs˜s
pjs˜
Pjs
)−σ
Xjs, (6)
Pjs =
(
S∑
s˜=1
τ1−σjs˜s p
1−σ
js˜
) 1
1−σ
, (7)
where Pjs denotes the price index for industry j in country s.
2.2 Production
Within each country-industry pair, all firms produce the same homogeneous output, but firms differ along
two dimensions: R&D capabilityψ and productivity θ. R&D capability is a time-invariant firm characteristic
that affects a firm’s R&D efficiency and, consequently, the evolution of its productivity. Section 2.3 describes
technology investment and productivity dynamics. I assume the distribution of R&D capabilities in each
industry has support
[
ψmin, ψmax
]
and a continuous cumulative distribution function G(ψ) that does not
vary by country.
Productivity is a time-varying, firm-level state variable that determines a firm’s production efficiency.
Labor is the only factor of production. A firm in industry j and country s with productivity θ that employs
lP production workers produces output:
y = θ
(
lP
)β
, with 0 < β < 1. (8)
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The production technology is independent of the firm’s R&D capability ψ.
Each firm chooses production employment to maximize production profits πP = pjsy − wsl
P taking
the output price pjs, the wage ws and its productivity θ as given.
3 The assumption β < 1 implies the firm’s
revenue function is strictly concave in employment. Solving the profit maximization problem implies the
firm’s production employment lPjs, output yjs and production profits π
P
js are given by:
lPjs(θ) =
(
βpjsθ
ws
) 1
1−β
, (9)
yjs(θ) =
(
βpjs
ws
) β
1−β
θ
1
1−β , (10)
πPjs(θ) = (1− β)
(
β
ws
) β
1−β
(pjsθ)
1
1−β . (11)
Employment, output and profits are all increasing in the firm’s productivity and the output price, but de-
creasing in the wage level.
In country s, good j is produced by a massMjs of firms and the cumulative distribution function of firm
productivity is Hjs(θ). Both Mjs and Hjs are endogenous. Mjs is determined by the free entry condition
described in Section 2.5, whileHjs depends upon firms’ technology investment choices. Summing up across
firms we have that aggregate production employment LPjs in industry j and country s is:
LPjs = Mjs
(
βpjs
ws
) 1
1−β
∫
θ
θ
1
1−β dHjs(θ), (12)
and aggregate output is:
Yjs = Mjs
(
βpjs
ws
) β
1−β
∫
θ
θ
1
1−β dHjs(θ). (13)
2.3 Technology Investment
Firms can increase their productivity by investing in technology upgrading. Firms choose between two forms
of technology investment: R&D and adoption. R&D investment seeks to create new ideas and technologies,
while firms that choose adoption aim to learn existing production techniques and adapt these techniques to
3Technology investment affects future productivity growth (see Section 2.3), but not the current value of θ. Consequently, the
firm’s static production decision is separable from its dynamic technology investment decision.
9
improve their production methods. I assume the R&D technology is such that a firm with capability ψ and
productivity θ that employs lR workers in R&D has productivity growth:
θ˙
θ
= ψBs
(
θ
χRjs
)−γj (
lR
)α
− δ, (14)
where γj > 0, δ > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1).
Firms with a higher capability ψ are better at R&D. In equilibrium, this will lead to cross-firm hetero-
geneity in R&D investment and productivity. R&D efficiency also differs across countries due to variation
in Bs which captures differences in the quality of a country’s national innovation system. Countries with a
higherBs have an absolute advantage in R&D. Knowledge spillovers allow firms that perform R&D to build
upon the knowledge created by past innovations at home and abroad and χRjs denotes the R&D knowledge
level in industry j and country s. A higher knowledge level raises the efficiency of R&D investment. χRjs
is defined in Section 2.4 and depends upon the domestic productivity frontier and global knowledge capi-
tal. The returns to scale in R&D are given by α, while δ is the rate at which a firm’s technical knowledge
depreciates causing its productivity to decline.
Conditional on a firm’s capability and R&D employment, the R&D technology implies productivity
growth is decreasing in the firm’s current productivity (relative to the knowledge level) with elasticity γj .
This means there exists an advantage of backwardness that benefits firms further from the technology frontier
(Gerschenkron 1962; Nelson and Phelps 1966). Using industry level data for OECD countries, Griffith,
Redding and Van Reenen (2004) find that the effect of R&D on productivity growth is increasing in distance
to the frontier. At the firm level, Bartelsman, Haskel and Martin (2008) and Griffith, Redding and Simpson
(2009) both estimate that lower productivity relative to the domestic frontier raises productivity growth in
the UK. I allow the strength of the advantage of backwardness γj to vary by industry to capture differences
in the extent to which generating new ideas and techniques is harder for more productive firms.
The requirements for successful technology adoption are closely related to those needed for innovation.
For example, when discussing Japan’s industrialization Rosenberg (1990, p.152) argues that “Although the
contrast between imitation and innovation is often sharply drawn ... It is probably a mistake to believe that
the skills required for successful borrowing and imitation are qualitatively drastically different from those
required for innovation.” Consequently, I let the functional form of the adoption technology be the same as
that of the R&D technology. However, adoption does differ from R&D in two important ways. First, it does
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not require the rare combination of firm capability and institutional support that enables knowledge creation.
Therefore, I assume neither firm-level R&D capability ψ nor country-level R&D efficiency Bs affect the
efficiency of adoption investment BA.4 Second, adoption draws more heavily on existing knowledge than
R&D, which I model by assuming the adoption knowledge level χAjs is greater than the R&D knowledge
level χRjs. Given these assumptions the adoption technology is:
θ˙
θ
= BA
(
θ
χAjs
)−γj (
lA
)α
− δ, (15)
where lA denotes adoption employment and:
χAjs = ηχ
R
js, with η > 1. (16)
I also assume that the decreasing returns to scale in technology investment implied by α < 1 applies to the
sum of R&D employment and adoption employment. It follows that no firm will ever choose to invest in
both R&D and adoption simultaneously.
Each firm faces a constant instantaneous probability ζ > 0 of suffering a shock that leads to the death
of the firm. Taking this risk into account, the firm chooses paths for employment in R&D and adoption to
maximize its value subject to the R&D technology (14) and the adoption technology (15). Let Vjs(ψ, θ) be
the value of a firm with capability ψ and productivity θ. Vjs(ψ, θ) equals the expected present discounted
value of the firm’s production profits minus its technology investment costs:
Vjs(ψ, θ) =
∫ ∞
t
exp
[
−
∫ t˜
t
(ιs + ζ) dtˆ
] [
πPjs(θ)− ws
(
lR + lA
)]
dt˜, (17)
where πPjs(θ) is given by (11). All endogenous variables in this expression, including the firm’s value
function, are time dependent.
2.4 Knowledge Spillovers
Knowledge is non-rival and at least partially non-excludable. Consequently, firms learn from the R&D
undertaken by their domestic and foreign competitors. However, knowledge spillovers are geographically
localized (Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson 1993; Branstetter 2001; Keller 2002) implying that domestic
4Appendix B shows that the paper’s findings are robust to allowing for the efficiency of adoption investment to depend upon Bs
provided the elasticity of adoption efficiency to Bs is below one.
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spillovers are weaker than international spillovers. The localization of spillovers can also vary by industry
due to differences in the importance of tacit knowledge, the degree of communication between firms within
and across countries, and the extent to which production techniques are “circumstantially sensitive” and
must be adapted to local requirements (Evenson and Westphal 1995). Peri (2005) and Malerba, Mancusi
and Montobbio (2013) find that knowledge flows in Electronics are more global than in other sectors.
The knowledge levels χRjs and χ
A
js capture knowledge spillovers. I assume knowledge is a function of
the domestic productivity frontier and global knowledge capital accumulated through past R&D investment.
I focus on intra-industry knowledge flows and do not allow for interindustry spillovers. To be specific, let ω
index firms and let Ωjs denote the set of firms operating in industry j in country s. Define:
θmaxjs (ω) = sup
ω˜∈Ωjs,ω˜ 6=ω
{θ(ω˜)} .
θmaxjs (ω) is the supremum of the productivity of all firms in industry j in country s excluding firm ω. Within
each country-industry pair there will always be either zero or a continuum of firms with any given productiv-
ity level.5 Therefore, θmaxjs (ω) = θ
max
js and does not vary with ω. The R&D knowledge level χ
R
js of industry
j in country s is given by:
χRjs =
(
θmaxjs
) κj
1+κj χ
1
1+κj
j , (18)
where χj denotes the global knowledge capital in industry j. Each firm takes the current and future values
of χRjs and the adoption knowledge level χ
A
js = ηχ
R
js as given when choosing its technology investment.
The knowledge level depends upon domestic spillovers through θmaxjs and global spillovers through χj .
The parameter κj > 0 determines the localization of knowledge spillovers, which varies by industry. A
higher κj implies spillovers are more localized because the elasticity of the knowledge level to the domestic
productivity frontier is increasing in κj , while the elasticity to global knowledge capital is decreasing. Since
knowledge spillovers are localized, firms in countries with a greater frontier productivity benefit from access
to a higher knowledge level.
The knowledge level is homogeneous of degree one in the pair
(
θmaxjs , χj
)
. Together with the assump-
tion introduced in equations (14) and (15) that productivity growth is a function of current productivity
5In steady state this follows from the assumption that there exist a continuum of firms with each capability ψ in the support of
G, see Section 3.2. Outside steady state it also requires assuming an initial condition in which there are either zero or a continuum
of firms with each (ψ, θ) pair.
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relative to the R&D and adoption knowledge levels, this homogeneity restriction is necessary for the exis-
tence of a balanced growth path. It ensures knowledge spillovers are sufficiently strong to sustain ongoing
productivity growth.
Global knowledge capital χj is a state variable of the world economy that increases over time as R&D
investment leads to the creation of new ideas and technologies. I assume growth in χj depends upon a
weighted sum of R&D investment by all firms in all countries:
χ˙j
χj
=
S∑
s=1
Mjs
∫ ψmax
ψmin
λjs(ψ)l
R
js(ψ)dG(ψ). (19)
where λjs(ψ) ≥ 0 gives the strength of R&D spillovers, which I allow to vary by industry j, country s and
the firm’s R&D capability ψ. Investment in adoption does not affect the global knowledge capital because
it does not generate any new ideas.
2.5 Entry
Entrants must pay a fixed cost to establish a firm. To set-up a unit flow of new firms, a potential entrant
must hire fE workers where fE > 0 is an entry cost parameter. Following the idea flows literature (Luttmer
2007; Sampson 2016a) I assume the capability ψ and initial productivity θ of each entrant are determined by
a random draw from the joint distribution of ψ and θ in the entrants’ country and industry when the new firm
is created. This implies the existence of spillovers from incumbents to entrants within a country-industry
pair.6
There is free entry and the free entry condition requires the cost of entry equals the expected value of
entry meaning:
fEws =
∫
(ψ,θ)
Vjs(ψ, θ)dH˜js(ψ, θ), (20)
where H˜js(ψ, θ) denotes the cumulative distribution function of (ψ, θ) across firms.
Let LEjs be aggregate employment in entry in industry j and country s. Then the total flow of entrants
in industry j and country s is LEjs/f
E . Since firms die at rate ζ this means the mass of firms Mjs evolves
according to:
6In Sampson (2016a) spillovers from incumbents to entrants lead to endogenous growth through a dynamic selection mecha-
nism. By contrast, in this paper there is no selection and R&D investment by incumbent firms is the source of growth.
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M˙js = −ζMjs +
LEjs
fE
. (21)
2.6 Market Clearing
To complete the specification of the model, we need to impose market clearing for labor, goods and assets.
The labor market clearing condition in each country s is:
Ls =
J∑
j=1
(
LPjs + L
R
js + L
A
js + L
E
js
)
, (22)
where production employment LPjs in industry j is given by (12), L
R
js denotes aggregate R&D employment,
LAjs denotes aggregate adoption employment and L
E
js is aggregate employment in entry.
Industry output markets clear country-by-country implying domestic output Yjs equals the sum of sales
to all countries inclusive of the iceberg trade costs:
Yjs =
S∑
s˜=1
τjss˜xjss˜. (23)
I assume there is no international lending and asset markets clear at the national level. Therefore, for
each country s total asset holdings equal the aggregate value of all domestic firms:
asLs =
J∑
j=1
Mjs
∫
(ψ,θ)
Vjs(ψ, θ)dH˜js(ψ, θ). (24)
I also let global consumption expenditure be the numeraire implying:
S∑
s=1
zscsLs = 1. (25)
Finally, I assume the parameters that govern the returns to scale in production and R&D, the advantage
of backwardness and the localization of knowledge spillovers satisfy the following restriction.
Assumption 1. For all industries j, the parameters of the global economy satisfy: 11−β > γj >
α
1−β+
κjγj
1+κj
.
Assumption 1 is sufficient to ensure concavity in firms’ intertemporal optimization problems.
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2.7 Equilibrium
An equilibrium of the global economy is defined by time paths for consumption per capita cs, assets per
capita as, the wage ws, the interest rate ιs, the consumption price zs, consumption levels Xjs and xjs˜s,
prices Pjs and pjs, production employment L
P
js, industry output Yjs, the mass of firms Mjs, knowledge
levels χRjs and χ
A
js, global knowledge capital χj , R&D employment L
R
js, adoption employment L
A
js, entry
employment LEjs and the joint distribution of firms’ capabilities and productivity levels H˜js(ψ, θ) for all
countries s, s˜ = 1, . . . , S and all industries j = 1, . . . J such that: (i) individuals choose consumption
per capita to maximize utility subject to the budget constraint (1) giving the Euler equation (2) and the
transversality condition (3); (ii) individuals’ intratemporal consumption choices imply consumption levels
and prices satisfy (4)-(7); (iii) firms choose production employment to maximize production profits imply-
ing industry level production employment and output are given by (12) and (13), respectively; (iv) firms’
productivity levels evolve according to the R&D technology (14) and the adoption technology (15) and firms
choose R&D and adoption employment to maximize their value (17); (v) the R&D and adoption knowledge
levels are given by (16) and (18); (vi) global knowledge capital evolves according to (19); (vii) there is free
entry and entrants draw capability and productivity levels from the joint distribution H˜js(ψ, θ) implying the
free entry condition (20) holds and the mass of firms evolves according to (21), and; (viii) labor, output and
asset market clearing imply (22)-(24) hold.
The economy’s state variables are the joint distributions H˜js(ψ, θ) of firms’ capabilities and productivity
levels for all country-industry pairs, global knowledge capital χj in each industry and the mass of firmsMjs
in all countries and industries. An initial condition is required to pin down the initial values of these state
variables. Note that, apart from any differences in initial conditions, the only exogenous sources of cross-
country variation in this model are differences in R&D efficiency Bs, population Ls and trade costs τjs˜s.
3 Balanced Growth Path
This section analyzes a balanced growth path equilibrium of the global economy. I define a balanced growth
path as an equilibrium in which all aggregate country and industry level variables grow at constant rates and
the productivity distributionsHjs(θ) shift outwards at constant rates. In what follows I outline how to solve
for a balanced growth path and characterize its properties. Full details of the solution together with proofs
of the propositions can be found in Appendix A.
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3.1 Growth Rates
The first step in solving the model is to derive a set of restrictions on equilibrium growth rates that must hold
on any balanced growth path. Let gj be the growth rate of global knowledge capital χj . Differentiating (16)
and (18) yields:
χ˙Ajs
χAjs
=
χ˙Rjs
χRjs
=
κj
1 + κj
θ˙maxjs
θmaxjs
+
gj
1 + κj
.
It follows that on a balanced growth path the productivity frontier θmaxjs , together with the R&D and adoption
knowledge levels, must grow at constant rate gj in all countries.
7 Consequently, the productivity distribution
Hjs(θ) shifts outwards at rate gj for all s. This means Hjs(θ, t) = Hjs
(
egj(t˜−t)θ, t˜
)
for all times t, t˜ and
productivity levels θ. The productivity growth rate of each industry is constant across countries because
κj <∞ ensures the existence of some global knowledge spillovers.
Now let qs be the growth rate of consumption per capita cs. On a balanced growth path qs = q is the
same in all countries and equals a weighted average of productivity growth in the J industries where the
weights are given by the industry expenditure shares:
q =
J∑
j=1
µjgj . (26)
In this economy rising productivity is the only source of growth and since the productivity growth rate in
each industry does not vary by country, all countries have the same consumption per capita growth rate. It
follows that, on a balanced growth path, cross-country heterogeneity leads to differences in the levels, not
the growth rates, of endogenous variables.
On a balanced growth path we also have that consumption prices zs decline at rate q, while nominal
wages ws and assets per capita as remain constant over time. This implies real wages and assets per capita
grow at rate q. Employment in production, R&D, adoption and entry in each country-industry pair is time
invariant, as is the mass of firmsMjs. Industry output Yjs and the quantity sold in each market xjss˜ grow at
rate gj , while prices pjs and Pjs decline at rate gj . Finally, from the Euler equation (2) we obtain that the
interest rate is time invariant, constant across countries and given by ιs = ρ. Since the discount rate ρ > 0
and nominal assets per capita remain constant over time, the transversality condition (3) is satisfied.
7To see this, note that the R&D technology (14) implies balanced growth is possible only if the productivity frontier and the
R&D knowledge level grow at the same rate in each country.
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3.2 Firm-level Technology Investment and Productivity Dynamics
For the economy to be on a balanced growth path, the productivity distribution Hjs(θ) must shift outwards
at a constant rate gj . Is optimal firm behavior consistent with this requirement? The next step in solving the
model is to characterize firms’ technology investment choices and productivity growth rates taking the time
paths of ws, pjs, χ
R
js, χ
A
js and ιs as given. In particular, suppose the economy is on a balanced growth path,
implying ws is time invariant, pjs declines at rate gj , χ
R
js and χ
A
js both grow at rate gj , and ιs = ρ.
To solve for firms technology investment choices, we must start by determining whether firms invest
in R&D or adoption. A higher capability ψ increases R&D efficiency, but not adoption efficiency. Conse-
quently, there exists a capability threshold ψ∗js such that firms invest in R&D if and only if their capability
exceeds ψ∗js. From (14)-(16) we have:
ψ∗js = η
γj
BA
Bs
, (27)
implying the R&D threshold is increasing in the advantage of backwardness γj , decreasing in R&D effi-
ciency Bs and independent of the firm’s current productivity. This means that, on the extensive margin,
there is more R&D in industries where the advantage of backwardness is smaller and in countries that are
better at R&D.8
Now consider the R&D investment problem faced by a firm with capability ψ ≥ ψ∗js. Let φ ≡(
θ/χRjs
) 1
1−β
be the firm’s productivity relative to the R&D knowledge level. Taking the time derivative
of φ and using the R&D technology (14) implies:
φ˙
φ
=
1
1− β
[
ψBsφ
−γj(1−β)
(
lR
)α
− (δ + gj)
]
. (28)
Substituting the production profits function (11) into the value function (17), using ιs = ρ and changing
variables from θ to φ, the optimization problem of a firm with capability ψ can be written as:
max
φ,lR
∫ ∞
t
e−(ρ+ζ)(t˜−t)ws

1− β
β
(
βpjsχ
R
js
ws
) 1
1−β
φ− lR

 dt˜,
subject to the growth of φ being given by (28) and an initial value for φ at time t. Since ws is constant, pjs
declines at rate gj and χ
R
js grows at rate gj , the payoff function depends upon time only through exponential
8I assume parameter values such that ψ∗js ∈
(
ψmin, ψmax
)
∀s implying both adoption and R&D take place in every country.
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discounting meaning the firm faces a discounted infinite-horizon optimal control problem with state variable
φ and control variable lR. I prove in Appendix A that any solution to the firm’s problem must satisfy:
l˙R
lR
=
1
1− α

ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)− αβ β1−βψBs
(
pjsχ
R
js
ws
) 1
1−β
φ1−γj(1−β)
(
lR
)α−1 . (29)
Equations (28) and (29) are a system of differential equations for φ and lR. Setting φ˙ = 0 and l˙R = 0
shows the system has a unique steady state φ∗js, l
R∗
js given by:
φ∗js =

αβ β1−β (ψBs) 1α
(
pjsχ
R
js
ws
) 1
1−β (δ + gj)
α−1
α
ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)


α
γj(1−β)−α
, (30)
lR∗js =

αβ β1−β (ψBs) 1γj(1−β)
(
pjsχ
R
js
ws
) 1
1−β (δ + gj)
γj(1−β)−1
γj(1−β)
ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)


γj(1−β)
γj(1−β)−α
. (31)
Under Assumption 1 there exists a neighborhood of the steady state within which the firm’s R&D problem
has a unique solution which, conditional on the firm’s survival, converges to the steady state. Thus, the
steady state is locally saddle-path stable. The existence of an advantage of backwardness is necessary for
the stability of the steady state because it introduces a negative relationship between productivity levels and
productivity growth holding all else constant. The steady state and transition dynamics are shown in Figure
1. Along the stable arm, relative productivity and R&D employment increase over time for firms that start
with φ below φ∗js, while the opposite is true for firms with initial φ above φ
∗
js.
The steady state has several important properties. First, in steady state all surviving R&D firms in an
industry have the same productivity growth rate gj . Second, φ
∗
js is increasing in ψ implying that, within each
country-industry pair, more capable firms have higher steady state relative productivity levels. This explains
why, even though R&D capability differs across firms, steady state growth rates do not. The advantage of
backwardness raises the R&D efficiency of less productive firms and, in steady state, this exactly offsets the
disadvantage from low ψ implying all firms grow at the same rate. Likewise, global knowledge spillovers
ensure that level differences across countries in the location of the productivity distribution offset the growth
effects resulting from all other sources of cross-country heterogeneity, meaning the industry productivity
growth rate is the same in all countries.
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Third, the steady state is consistent with two key stylized facts about R&D highlighted by Klette and
Kortum (2004): (i) productivity and R&D investment are positively correlated across firms since φ∗js and l
R∗
js
are both increasing in ψ, and; (ii) among firms with positive R&D investment, R&D intensity is independent
of firm size. To see this observe that using (10) and (31) implies the steady state ratio of R&D investment to
sales satisfies:
wsl
R∗
js
pjsyjs
(
φ∗js
) = α (δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)
, (32)
which is constant across firms within an industry. R&D intensity is increasing in the returns to scale in R&D
α, the knowledge depreciation rate δ and the industry growth rate gj , and decreasing in the advantage of
backwardness γj , the interest rate ρ and the firm exit rate ζ.
Next consider a firm that invests in adoption because it has R&D capability below the threshold ψ∗js.
Substituting (16) and (27) into (15) implies the firm’s productivity growth is given by:
θ˙
θ
= ψ∗jsBs
(
θ
χRjs
)−γj (
lA
)α
− δ.
Comparing this expression with the R&D technology (14) shows that the firm’s adoption investment problem
is equivalent to that of an R&D firm with capability ψ∗js. It immediately follows that the firm’s steady state
relative productivity and adoption employment are given by (30) and (31), respectively, with ψ = ψ∗js.
Moreover, the steady state is unique and locally saddle-path stable given Assumption 1. Choosing adoption
rather than R&D allows firms with capability below the R&D threshold to attain the productivity level of a
firm with R&D capability ψ∗js.
Recall that on a balanced growth path the productivity distribution Hjs(θ) must shift outwards at rate
gj . The evolution of Hjs(θ) depends upon productivity growth at surviving firms and how the productivity
distribution of entrants compares to that of exiting firms. Entrants draw their capability and productivity from
the joint distribution of ψ and θ among incumbents and all incumbents face instantaneous exit probability ζ.
Therefore, if all incumbent firms are in steady state, each new firm enters with the steady state productivity
level corresponding to its capability and the productivity distributions of entering and exiting firms are
identical. It follows that entry, exit and firms’ optimal R&D and adoption choices generate balanced growth
if and only if all incumbent firms are in steady state.9
9Formally, a balanced growth path only requires a mass Mjs of firms to be in steady state, which allows for individual firms
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On a balanced growth path both the location and the shape of the productivity distribution are endoge-
nous.10 The location varies by country and industry and depends upon ws, pjs, χ
R
js, χ
A
js and gj , which are
determined in general equilibrium as described in Section 3.3 below. Within each country-industry pair, the
shape of the productivity distribution depends upon the exogenous firm capability distribution G(ψ), the
R&D threshold ψ∗js and the parameters α, β and γj .
Consider two firms in the same country and industry with capabilities ψ and ψ′, respectively. The ratio
of these firms’ steady state productivity levels is:
θ∗js(ψ
′)
θ∗js(ψ)
=


(
ψ′
ψ
) 1−β
γj(1−β)−α , ψ′ ≥ ψ ≥ ψ∗js,(
ψ′
ψ∗js
) 1−β
γj(1−β)−α , ψ′ ≥ ψ∗js ≥ ψ,
1, ψ∗js ≥ ψ
′ ≥ ψ.
(33)
When both firms perform R&D, technology gaps and productivity inequality are strictly increasing in α and
β and strictly decreasing in γj .
11 An increase in α raises the returns to scale in R&D which disproportion-
ately benefits higher capability firms that employ more R&D workers. Similarly, an increase in β raises
the returns to scale in production giving higher capability, larger firms a greater incentive to raise produc-
tivity by increasing R&D investment. By contrast, a higher advantage of backwardness γj reduces steady
state technology gaps. Conditional on ψ∗js, productivity inequality between R&D and adoption firms is also
strictly increasing in α and β and strictly decreasing in γj .
Adopters constitute a fringe of firms with mass MjsG
(
ψ∗js
)
that compete with innovators. There is
no productivity inequality within adopters. However, a higher advantage of backwardness or a lower R&D
efficiency reduces industry-level productivity inequality by increasing ψ∗js and decreasing the fraction of
firms that choose R&D. Combining these results, it follow that aggregate productivity inequality within
each country-industry pair is strictly increasing in α, β and Bs and strictly decreasing in γj . From (9)-(11)
inequality in production employment, revenue and profits are also strictly increasing in α, β and Bs and
strictly decreasing in γj .
with zero mass to deviate from steady state. I overlook this distinction since it does not matter for industry or aggregate outcomes.
10By contrast, in most heterogeneous firm models following Melitz (2003) the lower bound is the only endogenously determined
parameter of the productivity distribution. This holds not only in static economies, but also in the growth models of Perla, Tonetti
and Waugh (2015) and Sampson (2016a). An exception is Bonfiglioli, Crino` and Gancia (2015) who allow firms to choose between
receiving productivity draws from distributions with different shapes.
11All results concerning inequality hold for any measure of inequality that respects scale independence and second order stochas-
tic dominance. See Lemma 2 in Sampson (2016b) for a proof of how elasticity changes affect inequality.
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Proposition 1 summarizes how balanced growth path productivity varies across firms within the same
country and industry.
Proposition 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. On a balanced growth path equilibrium all firms grow at the
same rate and within any country-industry pair:
(i) Firms that invest in R&D have higher productivity than firms that invest in adoption;
(ii) Among firms that invest in R&D, productivity and R&D employment are strictly increasing in firm
capability;
(ii) Productivity inequality across firms is strictly decreasing in the industry’s advantage of backwardness,
but strictly increasing in the returns to scale in production and R&D and the country’s R&D efficiency.
3.3 General Equilibrium
To complete the solution for a balanced growth path equilibrium we can now impose the remaining equilib-
rium conditions. Before doing so, let Ψjs be defined by:
Ψjs ≡
∫ ψmax
ψ∗js
ψ
1
γj(1−β)−αdG(ψ) +
(
ψ∗js
) 1
γj(1−β)−α G
(
ψ∗js
)
. (34)
Ψjs is the average effective capability of firms in industry j and country s accounting for the fact that
adoption is equivalent to R&D with capability ψ∗js. Ψjs is strictly increasing in the R&D threshold ψ
∗
js and,
therefore, strictly decreasing in country-level R&D efficiency Bs. It captures the benefits resulting from
selection into adoption, which are larger in countries with lower Bs.
Using the individual’s budget constraint, the definitions of the R&D and adoption knowledge levels, the
free entry condition, the goods, labor and asset market clearing conditions and firms’ steady state produc-
tivity and employment levels I show in Appendix A that on a balanced growth path:
Ls =
J∑
j=1
µj
ρ+ ζ
(
ζ + βρ+
αρ (δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)
)
Zjs, (35)
asLs =
J∑
j=1
µj
ρ+ ζ
(
1− β −
α (δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)
)
wsZjs, (36)
gj =
S∑
s=1
µj
α (δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)
Zjs
Ψjs
∫ ψmax
ψ∗js
λjs(ψ)ψ
1
γj(1−β)−αdG(ψ), (37)
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where:
Zjs ≡
S∑
s˜=1
τ1−σjss˜ (ρas˜ + ws˜)Ls˜w
−σ
s
(
BsΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
js
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
∑S
sˆ=1 τ
1−σ
jsˆs˜ w
1−σ
sˆ
(
BsˆΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
jsˆ
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
. (38)
Equations (35)-(37), together with the definition of Zjs in (38), comprise a system of equations in the 2S+J
unknown wage levels ws, asset holdings as and industry growth rates gj . Any solution to this system of
equations defines a balanced growth path. I prove in Appendix A that there exists a unique balanced growth
path in the case where J = 1 and there are no trade costs. In the general case, I assume existence and obtain
results that must hold on any balanced growth path.
R&D efficiencyBs enters the equilibrium equations not only directly, but also indirectly through ψ
∗
js and
Ψjs. In an economy without adoption these indirect effects do not exist. Sections 3.4 and 3.5 characterize
international technology and income gaps on a balanced growth path and show that the indirect effects
reduce the dispersion in outcomes across countries.
To gain insight into the determinants of growth in this economy, consider a single sector version of the
model. Setting J = 1 and substituting (35) into (37) yields:
g [ρ+ ζ + γ(δ + g)]
α(ρ+ ζ)(δ + g)
(
ζ + βρ+
αρ (δ + g)
ρ+ ζ + γ (δ + g)
)
=
S∑
s=1
Ls
Ψs
∫ ψmax
ψ∗s
λs(ψ)ψ
1
γ(1−β)−αdG(ψ).
The left hand side of this expression is a strictly increasing function of g with range [0,∞), while the right
hand side is a positive constant. Thus, there exists a unique equilibrium productivity growth rate g and, with
a single sector, the consumption growth rate also equals g by (26).
Growth is higher when R&D spillovers λs(·) are stronger and when there is more employment in R&D.
As in the canonical growth models of Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) this generates a scale
effect whereby growth is increasing in the size Ls of each country. It also implies growth is increasing
in the R&D efficiency Bs of each country because higher R&D efficiency reduces the R&D threshold ψ
∗
s .
Similarly, growth declines when adoption becomes more attractive relative to R&D due to an increase in
either the adoption knowledge premium η or adoption efficiency BA.
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Raising the number of countries in the global economy increases growth because the R&D spillovers
specified in (19) are global in scope. Consequently, global integration generates higher growth than autarky.
However, growth does not depend upon the localization of knowledge spillovers κ, which affects countries’
relative knowledge levels, but not the rate of increase of global knowledge capital. The growth rate is also
independent of the level of trade costs τ . Lower trade costs increase the effective size of export markets, but
also expose domestic firms to increased import competition. In this model, as in Grossman and Helpman
(1991, ch.9) and Eaton and Kortum (2001), these effects exactly offset, leaving R&D employment and
growth unchanged.
3.4 Technology Gaps and Comparative Advantage
On a balanced growth path all countries have the same growth rates regardless of their underlying dif-
ferences. Consequently, relative productivity levels remain constant over time when comparing countries
within the same industry. However, heterogeneity in R&D efficiency does lead to international variation
in productivity levels, which generates comparative advantage and cross-country gaps in incomes and con-
sumption. This section studies the technology gaps that support a balanced growth path equilibrium and
characterizes cross-sectional variation in exports and productivity.
Let θ
∗
js ≡
[
E
(
θ∗js
) 1
1−β
]1−β
measure the average steady state productivity of firms in country j and
industry s. The average productivity in country s relative to country s˜ is:
θ
∗
js
θ
∗
js˜
=

Bs
Bs˜
(
Ψjs
Ψjs˜
) γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α


1+κj
γj
. (39)
This expression is the cross-country analogue of equation (33), which gives the ratio of steady state pro-
ductivity levels for two firms in the same country and industry, but with different capabilities. We see that
variation in R&D efficiency is the only source of international technology gaps and that Bs has a direct
positive effect on productivity, as well as an indirect negative effect through Ψjs.
12 In addition, technology
gaps do not depend on the level of trade costs.
The direct effect of R&D efficiency results from firms in a country with lower Bs being less innovative,
all else constant. Consequently, they fall behind foreign firms until their advantage of backwardness is
12To see that the indirect effect is negative note that γj(1− β) > α(1 + κj) by Assumption 1 and that Ψjs is decreasing in Bs
by (27).
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sufficient to offset poor fundamentals and ensure they grow at the same rate as firms in more innovative
countries. The indirect effect is the result of countries with higher Bs having a lower R&D threshold
and, therefore, lower average effective capability Ψjs. However, the direct effect is always stronger than the
indirect effect and the net effect of higherBs on average productivity is strictly positive, implying an increase
in R&D efficiency shifts the productivity distribution in country s outwards relative to other countries.
The size of international technology gaps depends upon the elasticity of relative average productivity
to R&D efficiency. I will refer to this elasticity as the level of innovation-dependence, since it captures the
extent to which countries benefit from having higher Bs and being more innovative. Innovation-dependence
differs by industry because of variation in the advantage of backwardness γj and the localization of knowl-
edge spillovers κj .
13 Differences in innovation-dependence across industries give rise to Ricardian compar-
ative advantage. To see this, let EXjss˜ = τjss˜pjsxjss˜ denote the value of exports from country s to country
s˜ in industry j inclusive of trade costs. On a balanced growth path log exports can be written as:
logEXjss˜ = υ
1
js˜ + (σ − 1)
(
log θ
∗
js − logws − log τjss˜
)
, (40)
where υ1js˜ is a destination-industry specific term defined in Appendix A. Exports are increasing in average
productivity and decreasing in the wage level. An increase in average productivity raises exports by reducing
the output price pjs, whereas higher wages increase labor costs and raise the output price.
By substituting for θ
∗
js in (40) we obtain:
logEXjss˜ = υ
2
js˜ + (σ − 1)
(
1 + κj
γj
logBs +
γj(1− β)− α(1 + κj)
γj
logΨjs − logws − log τjss˜
)
,
(41)
R&D efficiency has a direct effect on exports as well as indirect effects through Ψjs and ws. Moreover,
(41) implies that the elasticity of exports to R&D efficiency equals σ − 1 times innovation-dependence.
Therefore, countries with higher R&D efficiency will have a comparative advantage in more innovation-
dependent industries. Differentiating (41) shows that the direct and indirect effects of R&D efficiency on
13Formally, I define innovation-dependence by: ∂ log
[
BsΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
js
] 1+κj
γj
/∂ logBs. In general, this elasticity may vary
across countries as well as industries. In Section 4 I estimate a first-order approximation of the model in which innovation-
dependence is constant within industries.
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comparative advantage reinforce each other and gives:
∂2 logEXjss˜
∂γj∂ logBs
= (σ − 1)
∂
∂γj
(Innovation-dependence) < 0,
∂2 logEXjss˜
∂κj∂ logBs
= (σ − 1)
∂
∂κj
(Innovation-dependence) > 0.
Innovation-dependence is decreasing in the advantage of backwardness and increasing in the localization of
knowledge spillovers. Consequently, countries with higher R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage
in industries with a lower γj and a higher κj . Proposition 2 summarizes these results.
14
Proposition 2. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. On a balanced growth path equilibrium:
(i) Countries with higher R&D efficiency have greater average productivity in each industry;
(ii) Countries with higher R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage in industries where the advantage
of backwardness is smaller and in industries where the localization of knowledge spillovers is greater.
The pattern of Ricardian comparative advantage is stable on a balanced growth path because the com-
bination of international technology gaps, the advantage of backwardness and global knowledge spillovers
imply productivity growth does not vary by country. The advantage of backwardness imposes a cost on
more productive firms by reducing the efficiency of their technology investment. In industries where the
advantage of backwardness is greater, this cost is larger. Therefore, a higher γj reduces technology gaps
between countries, just as it reduces technology gaps between firms within the same country. The indirect
impact operating through Ψjs reinforces this direct effect because the R&D threshold ψ
∗
js is increasing in
γj . This means that in industries where the advantage of backwardness is greater, the share of firms that
invest in R&D is lower and differences in R&D efficiency matter less. Both effects make industries with
higher γj less innovation-dependent, generating a comparative advantage for countries with lower Bs.
Countries with higher R&D efficiency have a higher domestic productivity frontier and, therefore,
greater R&D and adoption knowledge levels by (16) and (18). When domestic spillovers are stronger relative
to global spillovers these differences in knowledge levels are magnified, increasing the relative efficiency of
technology investment in more productive countries and raising the industry’s innovation-dependence. Con-
sequently, countries with higher Bs have a comparative advantage in industries where knowledge spillovers
14The proof of Proposition 2 does not use the labor, output or asset market clearing conditions. This implies the pattern of
comparative advantage does not depend upon how the market clearing conditions are specified.
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are more localized.
Proposition 2 highlights an important distinction between how the advantage of backwardness and
knowledge spillovers affect the global productivity distribution. Although a greater advantage of backward-
ness reduces the technology gaps between countries, stronger knowledge spillovers benefit those countries
that are better able to take advantage of spillovers. When spillovers are more localized, the beneficiaries are
the higher productivity countries that use better technologies and generate greater spillovers.
Before moving on, it is worth considering how other sources of industry heterogeneity affect compara-
tive advantage. Suppose the Armington elasticity σj , the capability distribution Gj(ψ), the returns to scale
in production βj , the returns to scale in R&D αj , the knowledge depreciation rate δj , the adoption knowl-
edge advantage ηj , the exit rate ζj and the entry cost f
E
j are industry specific, but the model is otherwise
unchanged. Then it is straightforward to show that all the equilibrium conditions derived above continue to
hold after adding industry subscripts to these parameters. This has three immediate implications.
First, Proposition 2 still holds, implying the model’s implications for how the advantage of backward-
ness and the localization of knowledge spillovers affect comparative advantage are robust to allowing for
these additional sources of cross-industry heterogeneity. Second, cross-industry variation in δj , ζj , f
E
j , the
industry expenditure shares µj or the strength of R&D spillovers λjs(·) does not generate comparative ad-
vantage. Third, if there is no adoption, meaning Ψjs is constant across countries, then Gj(ψ), βj , αj and
ηj do not affect comparative advantage. However, with adoption, it can be shown that countries with higher
R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage in industries with higher returns to scale in production βj
and R&D αj and in industries with a lower adoption knowledge advantage ηj . Higher returns to scale in
production and R&D increase the average technology gap between innovators and adopters within countries
as shown in Proposition 1, which gives a comparative advantage to countries where a higher proportion of
firms invest in R&D. A higher ηj raises the R&D threshold by (27), which shrinks international technology
gaps since the adoption technology is independent of R&D efficiency.
3.5 International Inequality
How do wages, income and consumption differ across countries on a balanced growth path? The intertem-
poral budget constraint (1) implies consumption per capita depends upon assets per capita, wages and the
consumption price through:
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cs =
ρas + ws
zs
.
The simplest case to consider is a single sector economy with free trade. In this case equations (35),
(38) and (39) yield:
ws
ws˜
(
Ls
Ls˜
) 1
σ
=
(
θ
∗
s
θ
∗
s˜
)σ−1
σ
=

Bs
Bs˜
(
Ψs
Ψs˜
) γ(1−β)
1+κ
−α


σ−1
σ
1+κ
γ
.
The relative wage of country s is increasing in its relative average productivity and, consequently, in its R&D
efficiency.15 Moreover, note that the elasticity of the relative wage to R&D efficiency equals (σ − 1) /σ
times innovation-dependence. From Proposition 2 we know that innovation-dependence is decreasing in
the advantage of backwardness and increasing in the localization of knowledge spillovers. Thus, wage
inequality caused by differences in R&D efficiency is higher when the advantage of backwardness is smaller
and when knowledge spillovers are more localized.
With a single industry, assets per capita as are proportional to ws by (35) and (36). Because of free
trade all countries also face the same consumption price zs, meaning that consumption per capita cs is
proportional to ws. Therefore, relative income per capita and consumption per capita levels are equal to
relative wages. It follows that international inequality in incomes and consumption is increasing in the
degree of innovation-dependence. When innovation-dependence is high, the technology gap between leaders
and followers is greater and this leads to larger dispersion in incomes and consumption. By contrast, low
innovation-dependence reduces the cost of being less innovative and shrinks international gaps. Proposition
3 summarizes these results.
Proposition 3. Suppose Assumption 1 holds, the economy has a single industry and there is free trade. On
a balanced growth path equilibrium:
(i) Each country’s wage, income per capita and consumption per capita relative to other countries is strictly
increasing in its R&D efficiency;
(ii) International inequality in wages, income per capita and consumption per capita resulting from differ-
ences in R&D efficiency is strictly decreasing in the advantage of backwardness and strictly increasing in
the localization of knowledge spillovers.
15The relative wage is also decreasing in relative population Ls/Ls˜ due to the assumption of Armington demand.
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In the general case with many industries and trade costs, innovation-dependence continues to be a key
determinant of international inequality. In particular, the elasticities of ws, as, zs and cs to Bs all depend
upon innovation-dependence in the J industries.16 For example, whenever there is free trade, the elasticity
of wages to R&D efficiency is:
∂ logws
∂ logBs
=
σ − 1
σ
∑J
j=1
(
ζ + βρ+
αρ(δ+gj)
ρ+ζ+γj(δ+gj)
)
µjZjs

∂ log
(
BsΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
js
) 1+κj
γj
/∂ logBs


∑J
j=1
(
ζ + βρ+
αρ(δ+gj)
ρ+ζ+γj(δ+gj)
)
µjZjs
.
This expression shows that wages are increasing in R&D efficiency and that the wage elasticity is propor-
tional to a weighted average of the industry innovation-dependence levels. Consequently, an economy-wide
increase in innovation-dependence increases the wage inequality caused by variation in Bs.
With trade costs, there is no simple expression for how relative wages and incomes depend upon R&D
efficiency. However, by estimating innovation-dependence it’s possible to calibrate the model and quantify
the impact of R&D efficiency. The next section takes up this challenge.
4 Estimation and Quantification
To quantify the contribution of R&D efficiency to international income inequality, I assume the economy
is on a balanced growth path and estimate the model to obtain countries’ R&D efficiency levels and the
innovation-dependence of each industry. R&D efficiency levels are inferred from variation in R&D intensity
within industries, but across countries. Given R&D efficiency, I then use trade data to estimate innovation-
dependence at the industry-level. With these parameters in hand, I calibrate the model and analyze the extent
to which observed wage and income inequality across OECD countries can be explained by differences in
R&D efficiency.
16This follows from the observation that Bs enters the balanced growth path equations for ws, as, zs and, therefore, cs only
through the term BsΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
js . See Appendix A for the derivation of equilibrium consumption prices zs.
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4.1 Empirical Strategy
In order to estimate the model, I assume a functional form for the R&D capability distribution and take
a first order approximation to the balanced growth path equilibrium under the assumption that the R&D
threshold ψ∗js is large. The first order approximation facilitates the empirical implementation by making the
equilibrium conditions used for estimation log-linear in R&D efficiency Bs.
Suppose the R&D capability distribution G(ψ) is truncated Pareto with lower bound ψmin = 1 and
shape parameter k, where k > 1
γj(1−β)−α
for all industries j.17 Using this functional form in (34) to
compute average effective capability Ψjs, letting ψ
max → ∞ and taking a first order approximation for
large ψ∗js yields:
Ψjs ≈
(
ψ∗js
) 1
γj(1−β)−α =
(
ηγj
BA
Bs
) 1
γj(1−β)−α
, (42)
where the second line follows from (27). I estimate and calibrate the model using this approximation. Since
the approximation drops terms of order
(
ψ∗js
)−k
, it is valid provided
(
ψ∗js
)−k
is small. When ψmax →∞,(
ψ∗js
)−k
gives the fraction of firms that invest in R&D. In UK data for 2008-09, 9.9% of goods firms report
performing R&D.
Let industry R&D intensity RDjs be the ratio of R&D investment to value-added in industry j and
country s. R&D intensity does not vary across firms that perform R&D by (32). However, RDjs also
depends upon whether firms choose R&D or adoption. Computing R&D intensity from (10), (30) and (31),
taking a first order approximation for large ψ∗js and using (27) to substitute for ψ
∗
js gives:
RDjs =
α(δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
k [γj(1− β)− α]
k [γj(1− β)− α]− 1
η−kγj
(
Bs
BA
)k
. (43)
Equation (43) shows that R&D intensity is higher in countries with greater R&D efficiency. A higher Bs
implies a larger share of firms select into R&D, which increases RDjs.
18 I will use equation (43) to infer
countries’ R&D efficiency levels Bs from within-industry variation in R&D intensity.
Next, we can calculate innovation-dependence using the approximation to Ψjs in (42). This yields
17The assumption ψmin = 1 is without loss of generality.
18The implication that cross-country variation in RDjs comes entirely from the extensive margin is not necessary to obtain the
industry and aggregate level predictions used for estimation and calibration. For example, if firm output is the sum of production of
a unit mass of non-tradeable tasks and R&D capability has distribution G(ψ) across tasks then all international variation in RDjs
will come from the intensive margin, but the balanced growth path is otherwise unchanged.
29
that the innovation-dependence of industry j is IDj =
(1−β)κj
γj(1−β)−α
. Note that IDj is increasing in κj
and decreasing in γj , meaning the patterns of comparative advantage characterized in Proposition 2 are
unaffected by using the approximation. We can also write the exports equation (41) as:
logEXjss˜ = υ
3
js˜ + (σ − 1) (IDj logBs − logws − log τjss˜) , (44)
where υ3js˜ = υ
2
js˜+
σ−1
γj
γj(1−β)−α(1+κj)
γj(1−β)−α
log
(
ηγjBA
)
. I will use this expression to obtain IDj from industry-
level bilateral trade data.19
Each industry’s innovation-dependence enters the general equilibrium conditions (35)-(37) through Zjs
defined in (38). Using the approximation to Ψjs in (42) we have:
Zjs =
S∑
s˜=1
τ1−σjss˜ (ρas˜ + ws˜)Ls˜w
−σ
s B
(σ−1)IDj
s∑S
sˆ=1 τ
1−σ
jsˆs˜ w
1−σ
sˆ B
(σ−1)IDj
sˆ
, (45)
which shows how the relationship between Bs and Zjs depends upon IDj . After estimating Bs and IDj , I
use (45) to calibrate the model in Section 4.5.
4.2 Data
This section briefly describes the data sources used for the empirical analysis. Full details can be found in
Appendix C.
The primary data constraint is the limited availability of internationally comparable R&D data at the
industry-level. I obtain R&D expenditure for 20 ISIC 2 digit manufacturing industries from the OECD’s
ANBERD database. The OECD defines R&D as “work undertaken in order to increase the stock of knowl-
edge . . . and to devise new applications of knowledge” (OECD 2015, p.44). This definition corresponds
to the model’s conceptualization of R&D as investment that seeks to expand the knowledge stock through
discovering new ideas or developing new production techniques. By contrast, the goal of adoption is to learn
about existing knowledge and techniques, meaning adoption investment should not be counted in R&D data.
The coverage of ANBERD at the 2 digit level has improved over time, but the annual data has many
missing values. Consequently, I pool data for 2010-14 and, for each year, keep countries where R&D
intensity is available for at least two-thirds of industries. This gives a baseline sample of 25 OECD countries
19In principle, innovation-dependence could also be estimated using measures of industry-level productivity. However, unlike
bilateral trade, productivity is not directly observable.
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with R&D intensity data.
Value-added, output and trade by 2 digit ISIC industry for 2010-14 are taken from the OECD’s STAN
database. Gravity variables are from the CEPII gravity data set. Additional country-level variables are
obtained from the Penn World Tables, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics and the World Bank’s
Worldwide Governance Indicators, Financial Structure Database and Doing Business data set.
The analysis also uses firm-level data on R&D investment in the UK. This data comes from two surveys
undertaken by the Office for National Statistics: Business Expenditure on R&D, and; the Annual Business
Survey.
4.3 Estimation
The first step in estimating the model is to obtain R&D efficiency. Equation (43) shows that relative R&D ef-
ficiency can be recovered from relative R&D intensity levels within industries. Specifically, RDjs/RDjs˜ =
(Bs/Bs˜)
k
. Therefore, I let:
bs =
1
Ns
2014∑
t=2010
20∑
j=1
log
(
RDjst
RDjs˜t
)
, (46)
where the summation omits any years and industries for which R&D intensity is missing,Ns is the number of
non-missing observations and s˜ is a reference country. bs measures k logBs up to an unidentified additive
constant. As a normalization, I set R&D efficiency in the US equal to one, BUS = 1. Figure 2 plots bs
against GDP per capita. On average richer countries have better national innovation systems and, therefore,
higher bs, but there are notable differences in R&D efficiency even within the wealthiest group of countries.
Next, to estimate innovation-dependence levels, we need to specify bilateral trade costs. Following
Eaton and Kortum (2002), I model trade costs as a function of gravity variables. I also include exporter-
industry fixed effects to capture the possibility that export costs vary by countries as argued by Waugh
(2010). Specifically, suppose τjss = 1 meaning there are no internal trade costs and that international trade
costs can be expressed as:
log τjss˜ = DIST
i
jss˜ +BORDjss˜ + CLANGjss˜ + FTAjss˜ + δ
1
js,
where: the impact of bilateral distance on trade costs DIST ijss˜ depends on which of i = 1, . . . , 6 inter-
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vals the distance between countries s and s˜ belongs to: [0, 375), [375, 750), [750, 1500), [1500, 3000),
[3000, 6000), or ≥ 6000 miles; BORDjss˜ denotes the effect of sharing a border; CLANGjss˜ gives the
effect of sharing a common language; FTAjss˜ is the impact of having a free trade agreement, and; δ
1
js is
an exporter-industry fixed effect. The impact of all gravity variables on trade costs is allowed to vary by
industry j.
Using this specification of trade costs, we can rearrange the bilateral trade equation (44) to obtain the
following estimating equation:
log
(
EXjss˜
EXjs˜s˜
)
− (σ − 1) log
(
ws˜
ws
)
= − (σ − 1)
IDj
k
bs˜ (47)
− (σ − 1)
(
DIST ijss˜ +BORDjss˜ + CLANGjss˜ + FTAjss˜ + δ
2
js
)
+ ǫjss˜,
where δ2js = δ
1
js−IDjbs/k and the error term ǫjss˜ includes unmodelled variation in trade costs, productivity
and comparative advantage. Sales of domestic production to the domestic marketEXjs˜s˜ equal the difference
between output and total exports. Therefore, the left hand side of (47) is observable given industry-level
trade and output, country-level nominal wages and a value for σ − 1. From (40), we see that σ − 1 equals
both the trade elasticity and the elasticity of exports to average productivity. Costinot, Donaldson and
Komunjer (2012) estimate this elasticity in an Eaton and Kortum (2002) framework. I start by setting σ − 1
equal to their preferred estimate of 6.53, while Section 4.5 analyzes the implications of using alternative
trade elasticity estimates.
Table 1, column (a) reports estimates of IDj/k obtained from (47) using pooled trade data for 2010-14.
The sample includes exports of 117 countries to the 25 importers with R&D intensity data and covers 22
ISIC goods industries at the 2 digit level of aggregation (the 20 manufacturing industries used to calculate
R&D efficiency plus the Agriculture and Mining industries). Innovation-dependence is estimated relative to
the shape parameter of the R&D capability distribution k. However, note that k cancels out when estimated
innovation-dependence is multiplied by bs. When calibrating the model, the product of these two terms is
sufficient to quantify the impact of R&D efficiency on comparative advantage, wages and income levels.
Consequently, we do not need to calibrate k.
In column (a), estimated innovation-dependence is highest in the Machinery, Computers, Electrical
equipment, and Pharmaceutical industries. It is lowest in the Mining, Agriculture, Petroleum, Food and
32
Leather industries. However, these estimates are likely to be biased upwards. To understand why, suppose
there exist productivity differences across countries due to causes other than R&D efficiency. For example,
conditional on the technological component of firm-level productivity θ, the efficiency of production may
vary across countries because of differences in institutions, governance and infrastructure. We can allow for
this possibility by assuming that, instead of (8), the production function is y = Ajsθ
(
lP
)β
where Ajs is the
allocative efficiency of industry j in country s, which is exogenous and time invariant. Otherwise, the model
is unchanged. If countries with better national innovation systems also have better economic institutions and
policies more broadly, allocative efficiency Ajs and R&D efficiency Bs will be positively correlated.
It is straightforward to solve the model incorporating Ajs (see Appendix B for details). Except for
the fact that Ajs is present in the equilibrium conditions, none of the results in Section 3 are affected. In
particular, exports are still given by (41) after adding (σ−1)Ajs to the right hand side. This implies the error
term in (47) is a function of the importer’s allocative efficiency Ajs˜ and any positive correlation between
Ajs˜ and bs˜ will lead to upwards bias in the estimates of innovation-dependence.
20
To control for other sources of productivity variation, I use the importer’s institutional quality, business
environment and financial development. Institutional quality is measured by the rule of law, control of
corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, and voice and accountability
variables from the Worldwide Governance Indicators. Business environment is the country’s distance to the
frontier in the Doing Business data set. Financial development is measured by the log of private credit as
a share of GDP. Column (b) shows the results from estimating (47) including these variables. As expected,
the magnitude of the innovation-dependence estimates declines, but the pattern of cross-industry variation
is similar to column (a).
Column (c) also controls for sources of comparative advantage beyond R&D efficiency. I include the
interactions of industry dummy variables with the importer’s rule of law, log private credit to GDP ratio, log
physical capital per employee and human capital. This specification allows for comparative advantage due
to institutional quality (Nunn 2007), financial development (Manova 2013) and Heckscher-Ohlin effects
(Romalis 2004). Adding the comparative advantage controls further reduces the innovation-dependence
estimates. Average innovation-dependence in column (c) is 0.31, compared to 0.46 in column (b) and 0.62
in column (a). However, inter-industry variation in innovation-dependence is similar to columns (a) and (b).
The correlation between the innovation-dependence estimates in column (c) and those in either column (a)
20The right hand side of (47) also depends upon Ajs, but this is captured by the exporter-industry fixed effect δ
2
js.
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or column (b) is 0.79.
Going forward, I will work with the estimates in column (c). According to these estimates, innovation-
dependence is largest in the Computers, Electrical equipment and Chemicals industries and is positive and
significant at the 5% level in all industries except Mining. The estimates imply that moving from the 25th
to the 75th percentile of the R&D efficiency distribution increases a country’s exports by 57% more for an
industry at the 75th percentile of the innovation-dependence distribution than for an industry at the 25th
percentile.
4.4 Model Validation
Before calibrating the model, I undertake two validation exercises to assess the model’s empirical credibility.
First, I examine cross-industry variation in firm-level R&D investment choices. Second, I conduct an out-
of-sample test of the model’s predictions for comparative advantage.
Firm-level R&D investment. The first validation exercise analyzes whether cross-industry variation in
firms’ intensive and extensive margin R&D investment choices is consistent with the model. The share of
firms that invest in R&D ShRDjs equals
(
ψ∗js
)−k
, which is decreasing in the advantage of backwardness
γj by (27). Among firms with positive R&D investment, R&D intensity FiRDj is also decreasing in the
advantage of backwardness by (32). Manipulating (27) and (32) yields:
1
FiRDj
= −
1
αk log η
logShRDjs −
log
(
BA/Bs
)
α log η
+
ρ+ ζ
α(δ + gj)
. (48)
Figure 3 uses UK data to plot the inverse of FiRDj against negative logShRDjUK . Consistent with (48),
a positive linear relationship fits the data well for most industries. Moreover, departures from linearity are
negatively correlated with industry growth rates gj as predicted by (48). A robust regression of
1
FiRDj
on
− logShRDjUK and gj yields a positive coefficient on − logShRDjUK with p-value 0.00 and a negative
coefficient on gj with p-value 0.13.
21 This shows the model can account for how firm-level R&D decisions
differ across industries.
Data on the share of firms that perform R&D can also be used to assess whether cross-industry variation
in estimated innovation-dependence is consistent with the model. Innovation-dependence is decreasing in
the advantage of backwardness γj . Therefore, conditional on the localization of knowledge spillovers κj ,
21Industry growth rates gj are estimated using value-added volume per worker data for OECD countries. See Appendix C for
details.
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the model predicts that innovation-dependence is positively correlated with the share of firms that invest in
R&D. The model does not provide an observable proxy for κj , but Figure 4 plots the innovation-dependence
estimates from Table 1, column (c) against logShRDjUK . The two variables have a positive relationship
with a correlation coefficient of 0.41.22 Assuming this correlation is not driven by unobserved variation in
κj , Figure 4 supports the model’s empirical credibility.
Out-of-sample comparative advantage test. The second validation exercise uses the innovation-dependence
estimates from Section 4.3 to perform an out-of-sample test of the proposition that countries with higher
R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage in more innovation-dependent industries. The baseline esti-
mation covered 25 countries for which R&D efficiency could be computed from OECD data. To conduct
the out-of-sample test I use Eurostat data to calculate R&D efficiency for an additional 9 European countries
(see Appendix C for details). I then estimate the following variant of equation (47):
log
(
EXjss˜
EXjs˜s˜
)
− (σ − 1) log
(
ws˜
ws
)
= ξCompAdvjs˜ + Controlsjss˜ + ǫjss˜, (49)
where s˜ indexes the 9 out-of-sample countries, s indexes their trading partners,CompAdvjs˜ = − (σ − 1)
IDj
k
bs˜
equals the model-implied impact of R&D efficiency on comparative advantage and Controlsjss˜ denotes the
same set of trade cost, productivity and comparative advantage controls used in column (c) of Table 1. I
calculate CompAdvjs˜ using the innovation-dependence estimates from column (c) of Table 1 and setting
σ − 1 = 6.53. The model predicts the coefficient ξ of CompAdvjs˜ should be positive and equal to one.
To estimate (49), I use pooled trade data from 2010-14 for 20 ISIC 2 digit manufacturing industries and
117 partner countries. The estimated value of ξ equals 0.74 with a standard error, clustered by importer-
industry, of 0.060. Subject to the caveats that the estimation only uses R&D efficiency for 9 countries, and
that the estimate is a little below one, this result shows that the relationship between R&D efficiency and
comparative advantage that exists in the baseline sample is also present out-of-sample. This supports the
proposition that countries with higher R&D efficiency have a comparative advantage in more innovation-
dependent industries.
22TheMining industry is not shown in Figure 4 because it is an outlier with a negative (though insignificant) estimated innovation-
dependence. Including the Mining industry reduces the correlation with logShRDjUK to 0.39.
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4.5 Calibration
The goal of the calibration is to quantify the variation in wages and incomes due to differences in R&D
efficiency within the OECD. The calibration uses the 25 OECD countries from the baseline estimation
sample and is based on 2012 data. In addition to the 22 goods industries for which Section 4.3 estimated
innovation-dependence, I assume there is a non-tradable services industry. If industry j is non-tradable, then
(45) yields:
Zjs = (ws + ρas)
Ls
ws
.
Consequently, equations (35)-(37) imply equilibriumwagesws and assets as do not depend upon innovation-
dependence in the non-tradable sector. The intuition for this result is related to the Balassa-Samuelson effect:
in an open economy nominal wages are determined by productivity in tradable sectors. Since the innovation-
dependence of services is unknown, I will primarily focus on nominal wage variation when discussing
the calibration results. However, I also calculate real incomes under the assumption that the innovation-
dependence of services equals zero. This assumption will underestimate variation in real incomes caused by
differences in R&D efficiency if the innovation-dependence of services is positive.
Equilibrium wage and income levels can be calculated without calibrating all the model’s parameters.
To see this, recall from (32) that the R&D intensity of firms with positive R&D investment is given by:
FiRDj =
α(δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
.
Given FiRDj and the definition of Zjs in (45), equations (35) and (36) can be solved for ws and as without
knowing gj . Therefore, parameters such as the returns to scale in R&D α, the knowledge depreciation rate
δ and the strength of R&D spillovers λjs(ψ) are not required for the calibration.
The parameters used in the calibration are obtained as follows (see Appendix C for further details).
R&D efficiency, innovation-dependence and trade costs are taken from the estimates in Section 4.3. I use
the innovation-dependence and trade costs estimates from column (c) of Table 1 and set the innovation-
dependence of the Mining industry to zero. FiRDj is computed from UK firm-level data as in Section
4.4. Population levels Ls are taken from the Penn World Tables. I assume σ − 1 equals 6.53, consistent
with the value of the trade elasticity used to estimate the model. Expenditure shares µj are calibrated to the
36
average across OECD countries of each industry’s share of domestic absorption. The exit rate ζ is set to
0.103, which is the average OECD death rate of employer enterprises in the business economy excluding
holding companies. The share of profits in firm revenue before accounting for R&D investment is 1 − β. I
set β = 0.85 implying a profit share of 15% as in Gabler and Poschke (2013) and close to Barkai’s (2017,
Figure 2b) estimate of the aggregate US profit share in 2012. Finally, I let the discount rate ρ = 0.04, which
implies a risk free interest rate of 4% per annum.
I start by calibrating the model using observed R&D efficiency levels. Then, I calibrate a counterfactual
economy in which R&D efficiency is constant across countries, but the other parameters are unchanged. To
quantify the effect of R&D efficiency on nominal wages, I compute the log difference between calibrated
nominal wages in these two cases. I will refer to this difference as the calibrated log wage. Similarly,
calibrated log real income per capita is computed as the log difference between real income per capita in the
two calibrations.23
Figure 5 plots the calibrated log wage against log nominal wages from the Penn World Tables, with
both variables normalized to zero for the US. On average, countries where R&D efficiency is predicted
to generate higher wages have larger observed wages. For example, the wage gap relative to the US due
to differences in R&D efficiency is 32% for the Czech Republic and 14% for Italy. However, comparing
the scales of the two axes, shows that R&D efficiency explains only a fraction of observed wage variation.
Table 2 reports two statistics that formalize this observation (column a, row i). The estimated elasticity of
calibrated to observed wages is 0.30. The ratio of the standard deviation of calibrated log wages to the
standard deviation of observed log nominal wages is 0.36. These results imply R&D efficiency accounts for
around one-third of observed wage variation within the OECD.
As expected, given the assumption that the innovation-dependence of services is zero, R&D efficiency
accounts for a smaller share of variation in real variables than in nominal outcomes. Figure 6 plots calibrated
log real income per capita against observed log GDP per capita. In this case the estimated elasticity is 0.14
and the standard deviation ratio is 0.19 (column a, row ii). Thus, R&D efficiency can account for around
one-sixth of observed income per capita variation in the OECD, even assuming it does not effect productivity
in the services industry.
Columns (b)-(g) of Table 2 report a series of robustness checks on the baseline calibration results. For
23An alternative way to quantify the impact of R&D efficiency differences is to calibrate a counterfactual economy in which
R&D efficiency is the only parameter that varies across countries. Implementing this approach leads to similar quantitative results.
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each robustness check, I first estimate innovation-dependence levels and trade costs using a specification
based on column (c) of Table 1. Given these estimates I then calibrate the model and calculate the effect
of R&D efficiency on nominal wages and real incomes per capita using the same counterfactual method
as before. When calibrating the model, I set innovation-dependence equal to zero in all industries where
innovation-dependence is estimated to be either negative or insignificantly different from zero at the 10%
level.24
The first robustness check in column (b) includes an additional control when estimating innovation-
dependence – the interaction of industry dummy variables with the importer’s log GDP per capita. GDP per
capita proxies for omitted variables that affect productivity and comparative advantage and may be correlated
with R&D efficiency. However, because it is partly determined by R&D efficiency, it is not included in the
baseline specification. Average innovation-dependence declines slightly in this case, leading to a fall in the
explanatory power of R&D efficiency, but the difference is small.
In column (c) I restrict innovation-dependence to be homogeneous across all industries (except services).
In this case the estimated innovation-dependence is 0.29, a little below the average innovation-dependence
of 0.32 from column (a), but the nominal wage and real income variation accounted for by R&D efficiency
is effectively unchanged.
Section 3.5 showed that in a single sector economy with free trade the elasticity of relative wages to
R&D efficiency equals (σ − 1) /σ times innovation-dependence and, consequently, is increasing in σ hold-
ing all else constant. Allowing for multiple sectors and trade costs enriches the analysis and necessitates
the calibration of additional parameters. However, it does not change the intuition that, in addition to R&D
efficiency and innovation-dependence, the trade elasticity is a key parameter for the quantification. Conse-
quently, the remaining columns of Table 2 consider the impact of estimating and calibrating the model using
alternative values of the trade elasticity σ − 1.
Column (d) reduces the trade elasticity to 2.5, column (e) uses an elasticity of 4.5, which is close to
the aggregate elasticity estimated by Caliendo and Parro (2015), and column (f) increases the elasticity to
8.5. The results show that increasing the trade elasticity slightly reduces the average estimated innovation-
dependence and this offsets the direct effect of increasing σ, implying that the explanatory power of R&D
efficiency changes little.
24The only case where innovation-dependence is estimated to be significantly negative at the 10% level is for the Mining industry
when I set the trade elasticity equal to 2.5.
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Finally, column (g) uses the industry-specific trade elasticities estimated by Caliendo and Parro (2015).
With these elasticities, average innovation-dependence increases to 0.38, but the elasticity of calibrated to
observed wages declines to 0.24. Similarly, the standard deviation ratio for calibrated relative to observed
log wages falls to 0.30. These declines occur because the innovation-dependence estimates are negatively
correlated with the industry trade elasticities and because the changes in estimated trade costs compared
to the baseline specification serve to reduce nominal wage variation caused by R&D efficiency differences.
Combined, these effects more than offset the consequences of higher innovation-dependence. However,
despite this, R&D efficiency still explains around one-quarter of nominal wage variation within the OECD.
Looking at real income per capita, the offsetting forces are more closely balanced and R&D efficiency
continues to explain around one-sixth of observed variation. Collectively, the robustness checks reinforce
the conclusion that R&D efficiency accounts for a non-trivial share, although not the majority, of wage and
income variation within the OECD.
5 Conclusions
There are persistent productivity differences across firms, industries and countries. These differences give
rise to both Ricardian comparative advantage and international income inequality. To understand the ori-
gins and magnitude of productivity differences, this paper studies how innovation and learning determine
equilibrium technology gaps. Some firms and countries are more innovative than others, which gives them
a technological advantage, but the size of their advantage depends upon the advantage of backwardness and
the geographic scope of knowledge spillovers. Countries with an absolute advantage in R&D have a com-
parative advantage in innovation-dependent industries, where the advantage of backwardness is lower and
knowledge spillovers are more localized. The degree of innovation-dependence also determines the size of
international wage and income gaps due to differences in R&D efficiency.
I estimate the model using R&D investment by country-industry and bilateral trade data. There is sub-
stantial heterogeneity in innovation-dependence across industries and, consistent with the model’s predic-
tions, innovation-dependence is positively correlated with R&D intensity. Using the structural estimates to
calibrate the model, I find that differences in R&D efficiency account for around one-quarter to one-third
of nominal wage variation within the OECD. This shows that, although spillovers and learning do reduce
productivity dispersion, technology gaps still play an important role in explaining cross-country productivity
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and income differences.
This paper focuses on trade and technology gaps, but the theory and empirical methodology it devel-
ops are applicable to other important questions. For example, industrial policy is frequently justified as a
tool to promote exports (or reduce imports) in particular industries. The model could be used to analyze
how the effects of industrial policy depend upon R&D efficiency, knowledge spillovers, the advantage of
backwardness and trade costs. It would also be interesting to extend the model to allow firms to invest in
international technology transfer through foreign direct investment or technology licensing. Alternatively,
embedding the R&D and adoption technologies in a model with differentiated products and monopolistic
competition would enable an analysis of the interactions between technology investment and selection in a
dynamic Melitz (2003) environment.
Finally, the framework is suitable for analyzing not only cross-sectional variation on a balanced growth
path, but also changes in the global economy. Numerical solutions could be used to study the transition
dynamics that occur when, for example, a country’s R&D efficiency improves. The empirical strategy could
also be adapted to estimate whether R&D efficiency and innovation-dependence have changed over time.
This would shed light on whether recent advances in information and communication technologies have
reduced international technology gaps and cross-country income dispersion. Through such applications, the
methods developed in this paper could further contribute to understanding the global economy.
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Appendices
A Proofs and Derivations
Analysis of growth rates in Section 3.1
On a balanced growth path the individual’s budget constraint (1) implies:
w˙s
ws
=
a˙s
as
= qs +
z˙s
zs
. (50)
while substituting the free entry condition (20) into the asset market clearing condition (24) gives:
asLs =
J∑
j=1
Mjsf
Ews.
Since there is no population growth it follows that M˙js = 0.
Next, the growth rate of production employment can be obtained by differentiating (12). Since the
productivity distribution Hjs(θ) shifts outwards at rate gj this yields:
L˙Pjs
LPjs
=
1
1− β
(
p˙js
pjs
−
w˙s
ws
+ gj
)
.
On a balanced growth path L˙Pjs = 0. Therefore, substituting (50) into the expression above we obtain:
qs =
p˙js
pjs
+ gj −
z˙s
zs
. (51)
Now, differentiating the industry price index (7) yields:
P˙js
Pjs
=
∑S
s˜=1 τ
1−σ
js˜s p
1−σ
js˜
p˙js˜
pjs˜
P 1−σjs
,
which is time invariant if and only if output prices pjs grow at the same rate in all countries implying:
P˙js
Pjs
=
p˙js˜
pjs˜
, (52)
for all s, s˜ = 1, . . . , S. Differentiating the consumption price equation (5) gives:
47
z˙s
zs
=
J∑
j=1
µj
P˙js
Pjs
.
Multiplying both sides of (51) by µj , summing across industries and using the previous expression, (52) and∑J
j=1 µj = 1 we obtain:
J∑
j=1
µjqs = qs =
J∑
j=1
µjgj ,
which shows that the growth rate of consumption per capita is the same in all countries and equation (26)
holds. The numeraire condition (25) then implies:
z˙s
zs
= −q, (53)
and substituting this result into (51) shows that output prices pjs and, therefore, also industry prices Pjs
decline at rate gj .
To obtain ιs = ρ, substitute (53) into the Euler equation (2). Note also that using (4) to substitute for
Xjs in (6) and appealing to (53) together with the fact prices decline at rate gj implies xjs˜s grows at rate gj .
It then follows from the industry output market clearing condition (23) that industry output Yjs also grows
at rate gj .
Solution to firm’s R&D problem in Section 3.2
The firm faces a discounted infinite-horizon optimal control problem of the type studied in Section 7.5 of
Acemoglu (2009). The current-value Hamiltonian is:
H(φ, lR, λ) =

1− β
β
(
βpjsχ
R
js
ws
) 1
1−β
φ− lR

ws + λ φ
1− β
[
ψBsφ
−γj(1−β)
(
lR
)α
− (δ + gj)
]
,
where λ is the current-value costate variable. From Theorem 7.13 in Acemoglu (2009), any solution must
satisfy:
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0 =
∂H
∂lR
= −ws + λ
α
1− β
ψBsφ
1−γj(1−β)
(
lR
)α−1
, (54)
(ρ+ ζ)λ− λ˙ =
∂H
∂φ
=
1− β
β
(
βpjsχ
R
js
ws
) 1
1−β
ws
+
λ
1− β
{
[1− γj(1− β)]ψBsφ
−γj(1−β)
(
lR
)α
− (δ + gj)
}
,
0 = lim
t˜→∞
[
e−(ρ+ζ)(t˜−t)H(φ, lR, λ)
]
, (55)
where equation (55) is the transversality condition. Differentiating the upper expression with respect to τ
gives:
(1− α)
l˙R
lR
= [1− γj(1− β)]
φ˙
φ
+
λ˙
λ
, (56)
and using the first order conditions of the Hamiltonian to substitute for λ and λ˙, and (28) to substitute for φ˙
we obtain equation (29).
Equations (28) and (29) are an autonomous nonlinear system of differential equations in (φ, lR) whose
unique steady state (φ∗js, l
R∗
js ) is given by (30) and (31). Suppose we write the system as:

 φ˙
l˙R

 = F

 φ
lR

 .
At the steady state, the Jacobian DF of the function F is:
DF

φ∗js
lR∗js

 =

 −γj (δ + gj) α1−β
φ∗js
lR∗js
(δ + gj)
−
1−γj(1−β)
1−α
lR∗js
φ∗js
[ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)] ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)

 .
The trace of the Jacobian is ρ+ ζ which is positive. The determinant of the Jacobian is:
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣DF

φ∗js
lR∗js


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = − (δ + gj) [ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)]
γj(1− β)− α
(1− α)(1− β)
,
which is negative by Assumption 1. This means the Jacobian has one strictly negative and one strictly
positive eigenvalue. Therefore, by Theorem 7.19 in Acemoglu (2009), the steady state is locally saddle-path
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stable. There exists an open neighborhood of the steady state such that if the firm’s initial φ lies within
this neighborhood, the system of differential equations given by (28) and (29) has a unique solution. The
solution converges to the steady state along the stable arm of the system as shown in Figure 1 in the paper.
From equation (56) it follows that λ˙→ 0 as the solution converges to the steady state. Since ρ+ ζ > 0 this
implies the solution satisfies the transversality condition (55).
The solution to (28) and (29) is a candidate for a solution to the firm’s problem. To show it is in fact
the unique solution we can use Theorem 7.14 in Acemoglu (2009). Suppose λ is the current-value costate
variable obtained from the solution to (28) and (29). Equation (54) implies λ is always strictly positive.
Therefore, given any path for φ on which φ is always positive we have limt˜→∞
[
e−(ρ+ζ)(t˜−t)λφ
]
≥ 0. Now
define:
H(φ, λ) = max
lR
H(φ, lR, λ),
=

1− β
β
(
βpjsχ
R
js
ws
) 1
1−β
ws −
λ (δ + gj)
1− β

φ+ 1− α
α
w
−α
1−α
s
(
αλψBs
1− β
) 1
1−α
φ
1−γj(1−β)
1−α ,
where the second line follows from solving the maximization problem in the first line. Assumption 1 implies
H(φ, λ) is strictly concave in φ. Thus, the sufficiency conditions of Theorem 7.14 in Acemoglu (2009) hold,
implying the solution to (28) and (29) is the unique solution to the firm’s optimal control problem.
Derivation of balanced growth path equilibrium equations (35)-(37)
Suppose the global economy is on a balanced growth path. Using (11), (17), (30) and (31) implies that on a
balanced growth path the steady state value of a firm with capability ψ ≥ ψ∗js is:
Vjs
(
ψ, θ∗js
)
=
(
1− β −
α(δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
)
ws
ρ+ ζ
×
[
ααβγjβBsψ
(
pjsχ
R
js
ws
)γj
(δ + gj)
α−1
[ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)]
α
] 1
γj(1−β)−α
,
where θ∗js = χ
R
js
(
φ∗js
)1−β
is the firm’s steady state productivity, which is growing over time. The steady
50
state value of firms with capability ψ ≤ ψ∗js, which choose adoption, is given by the same expression, but
with ψ = ψ∗js. Assumption 1 implies 1− β >
α(δ+gj)
ρ+ζ+γj(δ+gj)
which ensures Vjs
(
ψ, θ∗js
)
is positive.
Section 3.2 showed that on a balanced growth path each new firm enters with the steady state productivity
level corresponding to its capability. Since entrants’ capabilities have distribution G(ψ), substituting the
above expression for Vjs
(
ψ, θ∗js
)
into the free entry condition (20) yields:
fE =
(
1− β −
α (δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)
)
Ψjs
ρ+ ζ
[
ααβγjβBs
(
pjsχ
R
js
ws
)γj
(δ + gj)
α−1
[ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)]
α
] 1
γj(1−β)−α
.
(57)
Next, observe that on a balanced growth path:
∫
θ
θ
1
1−β dHjs(θ) =
∫ ψmax
ψmin
(
χRjs
) 1
1−β φ∗jsdG(ψ),
where φ∗js is given by (30) for R&D firms and by (30) with ψ = ψ
∗
js for adopters. Thus, by substituting
(12) and (31) into the labor market clearing condition (22) and using (21) with M˙js = 0 to solve for L
E
js we
obtain:
Ls =
J∑
j=1
Mjs
{(
1 +
α
β
δ + gj
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
)
Ψjs (58)
×
[
ααβγj−αBs
(
pjsχ
R
js
ws
)γj
(δ + gj)
α−1
[ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj ]
α
] 1
γj(1−β)−α
+ fEζ

 .
Similarly, substituting (4), (6), (13) and (30) into the goods market clearing condition (23) and using (57)
we obtain:
S∑
s˜=1
(
τjss˜pjs
Pjs˜
)1−σ
µjzs˜cs˜Ls˜ = f
E(ρ+ ζ)
(
1− β −
α(δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
)−1
Mjsws. (59)
We showed in Section (3.1) that on a balanced growth path a˙s = 0 and ιs = ρ. Therefore, the individ-
ual’s budget constraint implies:
zscs = ρas + ws, (60)
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while substituting the free entry condition (20) into the asset market clearing condition (24) gives:
asLs =
J∑
j=1
Mjswsf
E . (61)
Equations (57)-(61) together with consumption prices (5), industry price indices (7), R&D knowledge
levels (18) and knowledge capital growth rates (19) form a system of 4JS + 4S + J equations. To-
gether with the numeraire condition (25), the steady state relative productivity levels in (30) and the ini-
tial global knowledge capital in each industry χj these equations determine the 4JS + 4S + J unknowns
ws, as, cs, zs, gj , pjs, Pjs,Mjs and χ
R
js for all industries j = 1, . . . , J and all countries s = 1, . . . , S.
To simplify this system, start by substituting (57) and (59) into (58) giving:
Ls =
J∑
j=1
µj
ρ+ ζ
(
ζ + βρ+
αρ(δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
) S∑
s˜=1
(
τjss˜pjs
Pjs˜
)1−σ zs˜cs˜Ls˜
ws
. (62)
Using (7) to obtain the industry price index, (57) to substitute for pjs, (18) to give χ
R
js and (30) to solve for
relative steady state productivity levels then implies:
(
pjs
Pjs˜
)1−σ
=
w1−σs
(
BsΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
js
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
∑S
sˆ=1 τ
1−σ
jsˆs˜ w
1−σ
sˆ
(
BsˆΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
jsˆ
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
. (63)
Substituting this expression into (62) and using (60) yields equation (35). Equation (36) can be derived
in a similar manner by substituting (59) and (63) into the asset market clearing condition (61). Finally,
substituting steady state R&D employment (31) together with (57), (59) and (63) into (19) yields equation
(37).
Proof of existence and uniqueness of balanced growth path in single sector economy with free
trade
I will start by proving that, under free trade, equations (35) and (36) yield a unique solution for ws and as
given growth rates gj .
Free trade implies τjss˜ = 1 for all j, s, s˜ and using the numeraire condition (25) and equation (60) we
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have:
S∑
s˜=1
τ1−σjss˜ (ρas˜ + ws˜)Ls˜ = 1.
Using this result in (38) gives:
Zjs =
w−σs
(
BsΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
js
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
∑S
sˆ=1w
1−σ
sˆ
(
BsˆΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
jsˆ
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
, (64)
and substituting this expression into (35) implies that the S-dimensional wage vector w = (w1, . . . , wS)
satisfies f(w) = 0 where f : RS++ → R
S and element s of the vector f is given by:
fs(w) =
J∑
j=1
µj
ρ+ ζ
(
ζ + βρ+
αρ (δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)
) w−σs
(
BsΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
js
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
∑S
sˆ=1w
1−σ
sˆ
(
BsˆΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
jsˆ
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
− Ls.
Suppose the growth rates gj for j = 1, . . . , J are known. To prove that f(w) = 0 implies a unique
solution for wages I use results from Allen, Arkolakis and Li (2015). For all s = 1, . . . , S define the
scaffold function F : RS+1++ → R
S by:
Fs (w˜, ws) =
µj
ρ+ ζ
(
ζ + βρ+
αρ (δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj (δ + gj)
) w−σs
(
BsΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
js
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
∑S
sˆ=1 w˜
1−σ
sˆ
(
BsˆΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
jsˆ
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
− Ls.
Note that fs (w) = Fs (w, ws) for all s and the function F is continuously differentiable.
To prove existence it is now sufficient to show that conditions (i)-(iii) of Lemma 1 in Allen, Arkolakis
and Li (2015) are satisfied. Condition (i) follows from observing that, for any w˜, Fs (w˜, ws) is strictly
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decreasing in ws, positive for ws sufficiently close to zero and negative for ws sufficiently large. To see that
condition (ii) holds, note that 1− σ < 0 implying Fs (w˜, ws) is strictly increasing in w˜sˆ for all sˆ.
Now, given λ > 0 and w˜ ∈ RS++ define ws(λ) by Fs [λw˜, ws(λ)] = 0. Let u ∈ (0, 1) be such that
−1 + σu < 0. Then Fs
[
λw˜, λ1−uws(1)
]
is strictly negative if λ > 1 and strictly positive if λ < 1. Since
Fs (w˜, ws) is strictly decreasing in ws it follows that ws(λ) < λ
1−uws(1) if λ > 1 and ws(λ) > λ
1−uws(1)
if λ < 1. Therefore, when λ→∞, λ
ws(λ)
→∞ and when λ→ 0, λ
ws(λ)
→ 0 implying condition (iii) holds.
Thus, a solution exists.
To prove uniqueness I use Theorem 2 in Allen, Arkolakis and Li (2015). Since fs (w) is strictly
increasing in wsˆ whenever sˆ 6= s, f (w) satisfies gross substitution. Also, fs (w) can be written as
fs (w) = f˜s (w)−Ls where f˜s (w) is positive and homogeneous of degree minus one, while Ls is positive
and homogeneous of degree zero inw. Consequently, Theorem 2 in Allen, Arkolakis and Li (2015) implies
the solution is unique.
Using the solution for wages and equation (64) for Zjs, assets as are given immediately by (36). This
completes the proof that under free trade there exists a unique solution for ws and as given growth rates gj .
Now suppose the economy has a single sector. The discussion in the main text established that when
J = 1 there exists a unique equilibrium growth rate g. It follows immediately that, if J = 1 and there are
no trade costs, the global economy has a unique balanced growth path.
Proof of Proposition 2
To derive (39) start by substituting the free entry condition (57) into (30) and using θ∗js = χ
R
js
(
φ∗js
)1−β
to
obtain:
(
θ∗js
) 1
1−β =

fE ρ+ ζ
(δ + gj)
1
α
(
1− β
α
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
δ + gj
− 1
)−1 B 1αs
Ψjs


α
γj(1−β)
ψ
1
γj(1−β)−α
(
χRjs
) 1
1−β ,
(65)
where ψ = ψ∗js for firms that choose adoption. Setting ψ = ψ
max in this expression and using (18) to
substitute for χRjs then implies:
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θ∗maxjs =

fE ρ+ ζ
(δ + gj)
1
α
(
1− β
α
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
δ + gj
− 1
)−1 B 1αs
Ψjs


α(1+κj)
γj
(ψmax)
(1−β)(1+κj)
γj(1−β)−α χj .
Substituting this expression and (18) back into (65) and integrating over the capability distribution yields:
θ
∗
js =
[
fE
ρ+ ζ
(δ + gj)
1
α
(
1− β
α
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
δ + gj
− 1
)−1]α(1+κj)γj
(ψmax)
(1−β)κj
γj(1−β)−α χj
(
BsΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
js
) 1+κj
γj
,
(66)
and dividing this equation by the equivalent expression for country s˜ gives (39).
Using (4) and (6) the exports of country s to country s˜ in industry j are given by:
EXjss˜ = τ
1−σ
jss˜
(
pjs
Pjs˜
)1−σ
µjzs˜cs˜Ls˜.
Substituting (63) into this expression and taking logs we obtain equation (41) where:
υ2js˜ = log (µjzs˜cs˜Ls˜)− log

 S∑
sˆ=1
τ1−σjsˆs˜ w
1−σ
sˆ
(
BsˆΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
jsˆ
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj

 ,
and substituting (66) into this expression gives equation (40) where:
υ1js˜ = υ
2
js˜−(σ−1) log


[
fE
ρ+ ζ
(δ + gj)
1
α
(
1− β
α
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
δ + gj
− 1
)−1]α(1+κj)γj
(ψmax)
(1−β)κj
γj(1−β)−α χj

 .
Next, differentiating the definition of Ψjs and using that the R&D threshold ψ
∗
js is given by (27) yields:
∂ logΨjs
∂ logBs
=
−1
γj(1− β)− α
(
ψ∗js
) 1
γj(1−β)−α G(ψ∗js)
Ψjs
,
and differentiating (66) then implies:
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∂ log θ
∗
js
∂ logBs
=
1 + κj
γj

1− γj(1− β)− α(1 + κj)
(1 + κj) [γj(1− β)− α]
(
ψ∗js
) 1
γj(1−β)−α G(ψ∗js)
Ψjs

 ,
which is strictly positive. Inspection of this expression shows immediately that
∂2 log θ
∗
js
∂κj∂ logBs
> 0 and differ-
entiating with respect to γj gives:
∂2 log θ
∗
js
∂γj logBs
=
−1
γj
∂ log θ
∗
js
∂ logBs
−
α(1− β)κj
γj [γj(1− β)− α]
2
(
ψ∗js
) 1
γj(1−β)−α G(ψ∗js)
Ψjs
−
γj(1− β)− α(1 + κj)
γj [γj(1− β)− α]
∂
∂γj


(
ψ∗js
) 1
γj(1−β)−α G(ψ∗js)
Ψjs

 .
The first two terms on the right hand side of this expression are negative. Computing the derivative in the
third term and using the definition of Ψjs to collect terms gives:
∂
∂γj


(
ψ∗js
) 1
γj(1−β)−α G(ψ∗js)
Ψjs

 =
(
ψ∗js
) 1
γj(1−β)−α G(ψ∗js)
Ψ2js
[
log η
γj(1− β)− α
∫ ψmax
ψ∗js
ψ
1
γj(1−β)−αdG(ψ)
+ log η
ψ∗jsG
′(ψ∗js)
G(ψ∗js)
Ψjs +
1− β
[γj(1− β)− α]
2
∫ ψmax
ψ∗js
(
logψ − logψ∗js
)
ψ
1
γj(1−β)−αdG(ψ)
]
,
which is positive since η > 1. It follows that
∂2 log θ
∗
js
∂γj∂ logBs
< 0 as claimed in Proposition 2.
Derivation of balanced growth path consumption prices from Section 3.5
From (5) and (7) we have:
zs =
J∏
j=1
(
S∑
s˜=1
τ1−σjs˜s p
1−σ
js˜
) µj
1−σ
,
and combining (18), (57) and (65) with ψ = ψmax gives:
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pjs = β
−β (ψmax)
−(1−β)κj
γj(1−β)−α
[
fE(ρ+ ζ)
(
1− β −
α(δ + gj)
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
)−1] γj(1−β)−α(1+κj)γj
×
[
α(δ + gj)
α−1
α
ρ+ ζ + γj(δ + gj)
]−α(1+κj)
γj ws
χj
(
BsΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
js
)− 1+κj
γj
.
Using these two expressions to obtain the ratio of consumption prices in countries s and s˜ then yields:
zs
zs˜
=
J∏
j=1


∑S
sˆ=1 τ
1−σ
jsˆs w
1−σ
sˆ
(
BsˆΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
jsˆ
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
∑S
sˆ=1 τ
1−σ
jsˆs˜ w
1−σ
sˆ
(
BsˆΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
jsˆ
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj


µj
1−σ
.
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B Model Extensions
This appendix shows that the theoretical and quantitative results derived in Sections 3 and 4 are robust to
allowing for productivity differences not caused by variation in R&D efficiency and to allowing the adoption
technology to depend upon the quality of a country’s national innovation system. I introduce two extensions
of the baseline model. First, suppose there are exogenous productivity differences at the country-industry
level. Instead of (8), assume the production technology is:
y = Ajsθ
(
lP
)β
,
where Ajs is a time invariant allocative efficiency term that varies by country and industry.
Second, assume technology adoption is more efficient in countries with higher Bs. This assumption is
consistent with evidence that adoption and innovation draw upon similar capabailities (Rosenberg 1990).
Instead of (15), suppose the adoption technology is given by:
θ˙
θ
= Bνs
(
θ
χAjs
)−γj (
lA
)α
− δ,
where ν ∈ [0, 1). Imposing ν < 1 ensures adoption efficiency is less sensitive to the quality of a country’s
national innovation system than R&D efficiency.
With these two generalizations the model can be solved using the same series of steps detailed in Section
3. The main differences from the baseline model are as follows. The R&D threshold (27) is now given by:
ψ∗js =
ηγj
B1−νs
.
Steady state relative productivity and technology investment employment are still given by (30) and (31),
respectively, except that pjs is multiplied by Ajs in both equations. The general equilibrium conditions
(35)-(37) are unchanged other than that the definition of Zjs becomes:
Zjs ≡
S∑
s˜=1
τ1−σjss˜ (ρas˜ + ws˜)Ls˜w
−σ
s A
σ−1
js
(
BsΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
js
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
∑S
sˆ=1 τ
1−σ
jsˆs˜ w
1−σ
sˆ A
σ−1
jsˆ
(
BsˆΨ
γj(1−β)
1+κj
−α
jsˆ
) (σ−1)(1+κj)
γj
.
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Crucially, relative average steady state firm productivity levels are still given by (39), implying international
technology gaps due to R&D efficiency are independent of Ajs. However, allocative efficiency does affect
income levels (through Zjs) and comparative advantage. In particular, the bilateral exports equation (40) is
replaced by:
logEXjss˜ = υ
1
js˜ + (σ − 1)
(
logAjs + log θ
∗
js − logws − log τjss˜
)
.
Together these observations imply that all the main theoretical results from the baseline model continue
to hold, including Propositions 1, 2 and 3. However, allocative efficiency differences generate additional
variation in trade and income levels, while the elasticity of the R&D threshold ψ∗js to Bs is lower than in the
baseline model.
Taking a first order approximation to the generalized model for large ψ∗js yields equations (42) and (43),
but with BA replaced by Bνs . It follows that using (46) to obtain R&D efficiency gives k(1 − ν) logBs up
to an additive constant.
Calculating innovation-dependence using the approximation to Ψjs yields:
IDj =
κj(1− β)
γj(1− β)− α
+
ν
γj
γj(1− β)− α(1 + κj)
γj(1− β)− α
.
As in the baseline model, innovation-dependence is increasing in the localization of knowledge spillovers κj
and decreasing in the advantage of backwardness γj . Moreover, innovation-dependence is also increasing
in ν because a higher ν implies that R&D efficiency matters more for adoption. Using this new expression
for innovation-dependence, bilateral exports can still be written as (44), but with (σ − 1) logAjs added to
the right hand side. Consequently, by estimating (47) we can recover
IDj
k(1−ν) . This implies the estimates in
Table 1 should still be interpreted as estimates of innovation-dependence in the generalized model, only the
scaling constant has changed.
Finally, instead of (45), Zjs satisfies:
Zjs =
S∑
s˜=1
τ1−σjss˜ (ρas˜ + ws˜)Ls˜w
−σ
s A
σ−1
js B
(σ−1)IDj
s∑S
sˆ=1 τ
1−σ
jsˆs˜ w
1−σ
sˆ A
σ−1
jsˆ B
(σ−1)IDj
sˆ
.
As in the baseline model, Zjs is a function of B
(σ−1)IDj
s . It follows that wage and income differences due
to variation in R&D efficiency can be quantified without calibrating either Ajs or ν and that the calibration
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results from Section 4.5 have the same interpretation in the generalized model as in the baseline case.
C Data
R&D: R&D intensity is the ratio of business R&D expenditure in the OECD’s ANBERD database to in-
dustry value-added in the OECD’s STAN database for 2 digit ISIC Revision 4 manufacturing industries. To
reduce the number of missing observations, I merge industries 10 (Food), 11 (Beverages) and 12 (Tobacco)
into a combined industry labelled 1012 and industries 31 (Furniture), 32 (Other manufacturing) and 33 (Re-
pair and installation of machinery and equipment) into a combined industry labelled 3133. This leaves 20
industries in the sample.
I use R&D data from 2010-14 for country-year pairs where R&D intensity is observed for at least
two-thirds of industries. The sample includes 25 OECD countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico,
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, UK and USA. R&D data for Belgium,
France and the UK is allocated across industries based on product field, whereas firms’ main activity is used
for all other countries.
Trade: Bilateral trade for 2 digit ISIC Revision 4 goods industries is from the OECD’s STAN Bilateral
Trade by Industry and End-use database. Sales of domestic production to the domestic market is calculated
as the difference between output and the sum of exports to all destinations. Output at current national prices
is taken from the STAN Database for Structural Analysis and converted to US dollars using exchange rates
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics.
The trade sample comprises imports of the 25 countries where R&D efficiency is observed from all 117
partner countries that have a population greater than 1 million in 2010 and for which nominal wages can be
calculated using the Penn World Tables 9.0. The data covers 22 industries: the 20 manufacturing industries
included in the R&D intensity sample, Agriculture, forestry and fishing (labelled 0103), and; Mining and
quarrying (labelled 0508).
Gravity variables are from the CEPII gravity dataset. Distance is population weighted. The Common
language dummy denotes country-pairs that share a common official or primary language. The Free trade
agreement dummy denotes country-pairs that have notified a regional trade agreement to the World Trade
Organization.
Country-level variables: GDP per capita, population, nominal wages, physical capital per employee
and human capital are from the Penn World Tables 9.0. GDP per capita is defined as output-side real GDP
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at chained purchasing power parties (PPPs) divided by population. The nominal wage is calculated as
labor’s share of GDP times output-side GDP at current PPPs times the price level of current GDP divided
by persons engaged. Physical capital per employee is given by the capital stock at current PPPs divided by
persons engaged.
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are from the World Bank. Financial development, measured as
private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions as a share of GDP is from the World
Bank’s Financial Structure Database. Data for Canada is unavailable after 2008, so I extrapolate by holding
Canadian financial development constant at its 2008 value. Business environment is measured by a country’s
global distance to the frontier for Ease of doing business from the World Bank’s Doing Business data set.
All these variables are time-varying.
Firm-level R&D: The share of firms that perform R&D is computed from the UK’s Annual Business
Survey, which is a representative sample of production, construction, distribution and service industries.
Firms are asked whether they have “plans to carry out in-house Research and Development during the next
two years”. For each 2 digit goods industry I compute the weighted share (using sampling weights) of
respondents that answer yes to this question and report the average share for 2008-09. The data is reported
for UK SIC 2007 industries, which corresponds to ISIC Revision 4. The data does not cover Northern
Ireland.
To measure R&D intensity, I match the Annual Business Survey with the Business Expenditure on
Research and Development data set and compute R&D intensity as the ratio of total R&D expenditure to
approximate gross value-added at basic prices. Industry R&D intensity is then calculated as the median of
all firm-level observations pooled for 2008-09. Due to sample size restrictions on data disclosure, R&D in-
tensity for the Agriculture, forestry and fishing industry (0103) and the Coke and refined petroleum products
industry (19) are calculated using 2008-13 data.
Industry growth rates are estimated using OECD STAN data on value-added volumes per person engaged
from 1995-2014. The sample comprises the 27 OECD countries that report data for at least half the sample
years in at least half the sample industries. Each industry’s growth rate is estimated as the time trend from a
regression of log value-added volume per person engaged on a trend and country fixed effects.
Out-of-sample comparative advantage test: R&D intensity is calculated from Eurostat data as the
ratio of business expenditure on R&D to value-added at factor costs for 2 digit NACE Revision 2 manu-
facturing industries, which correspond directly to ISIC Revision 4 industries. As for the baseline sample, I
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merge industries 10, 11 and 12 and industries 31, 32 and 33, which leaves 20 industries. R&D efficiency is
calculated using equation (46), but with data from 2008-15 including those country-year pairs where R&D
intensity is observed for at least half of all industries. These sample selection criteria are weaker than for
the baseline OECD sample, which allows for a larger sample. Nine countries meet the criteria: Bulgaria,
Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Greece, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden. All other variables for the
out-of-sample test are taken from the same sources used for the baseline estimation, except for industry
output, which is from Eurostat. The sample covers bilateral trade in 20 manufacturing industries with 117
partner countries that have a population greater than 1 million in 2010 and for which nominal wages can be
calculated using the Penn World Tables 9.0.
Calibration parameters: Expenditure shares are calculated as the industry’s share of domestic absorp-
tion, where domestic absorption is defined as output plus imports minus exports. Output at current national
prices is taken from the OECD’s STAN Database for Structural Analysis and converted to US dollars using
exchange rates from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Imports and exports by industry are from
the OECD’s STAN Bilateral Trade by Industry and End-use database. The calibrated expenditure shares are
averages over all OECD countries for which data is available for all industries in 2012.
The exit rate is the average across OECD countries in 2012 of the death rate of employer enterprises in
the business economy excluding holding companies. Data on death rates is from the OECD Structural and
Demographic Business Statistics Business Demography Indicators using the ISIC Revision 4 classification.
Caliendo and Parro (2015) estimate trade elasticities for ISIC Revision 3 goods sectors at approximately
the 2 digit level of aggregation. I take their benchmark estimates from the 99% sample in Table 1. Caliendo
and Parro do not use the estimated elasticities for the Basic metals, Machinery and Auto sectors because
these elasticities are not robust across specifications. For these sectors, I set the trade elasticity equal to
the estimated aggregate elasticity. Caliendo and Parro’s sectors map one-to-one into 2 digit ISIC Revision
4 industries with the following exceptions: I map Textile to the Textiles (13), Wearing apparel (14) and
Leather (15) industries; Paper to the Paper (17) and Printing (18) industries; Chemicals to the Chemicals
(20) and Pharmaceutical (21) industries, and; for the Computers (26) industry I take the average of the
trade elasticities in the Office, Communication and Medical sectors. Caliendo and Parro estimate the trade
elasticity for Petroleum is 64.85, around four times larger than for the industry with the second highest
elasticity. Using this elasticity delivers very high trade cost estimates in the Petroleum industry for some
country-pairs. Consequently, to facilitate solving the model numerically, I censor the calibrated trade costs
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in Petroleum at the maximum estimated trade cost across all other industries.
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Figure 1: Firm steady state and transition dynamics
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Figure 2: R&D efficiency
Notes: R&D efficiency for 2010-14 calculated using OECD’s ANBERD and STAN databases. GDP per
capita in 2010 from Penn World Tables 9.0.
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Figure 3: Firm-level R&D investment
Notes: Share of firms that invest in R&D and median R&D intensity of firms with positive R&D investment
computed for UK industries from Office for National Statistics’ Annual Business Survey and Business
Expenditure on Research and Development data set. Both variables calculated for 2008-09 using 2 digit
ISIC Revision 4 goods industries.
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Figure 4: Innovation-dependence and selection into R&D
Notes: Innovation-dependence estimates from Table 1, column (c). Share of firms that invest in R&D com-
puted for UK industries from Office for National Statistics’ Annual Business Survey 2008-09. Industries
are 2 digit ISIC Revision 4 goods industries.
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Figure 5: R&D efficiency and nominal wages
Notes: Calibrated log wage from author’s calculations. Nominal wages in 2012 from Penn World Tables
9.0. Variables normalized to zero for the US.
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Figure 6: R&D efficiency and real incomes
Notes: Calibrated log real income per capita from author’s calculations. GDP per capita in 2012 from Penn
World Tables 9.0. Variables normalized to zero for the US.
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Industry (a) (b) (c) 
0.517 0.365 0.197
(0.0578) (0.0402) (0.0832)
0.437 0.283 ‐0.101
(0.0893) (0.0624) (0.134)
0.535 0.383 0.225
(0.0481) (0.0383) (0.0733)
0.578 0.449 0.317
(0.0470) (0.0439) (0.0587)
0.564 0.402 0.365
(0.0521) (0.0460) (0.0496)
0.536 0.407 0.383
(0.0493) (0.0551) (0.0733)
0.582 0.428 0.234
(0.0683) (0.0362) (0.0609)
0.633 0.472 0.355
(0.0590) (0.0338) (0.0593)
0.632 0.483 0.299
(0.0602) (0.0335) (0.0619)
0.534 0.388 0.185
(0.0531) (0.0427) (0.0816)
0.651 0.500 0.433
(0.0521) (0.0452) (0.0839)
0.698 0.527 0.293
(0.0783) (0.0604) (0.134)
0.658 0.501 0.391
(0.0576) (0.0334) (0.0451)
0.626 0.473 0.326
(0.0540) (0.0324) (0.0518)
0.648 0.456 0.302
(0.0430) (0.0424) (0.0808)
0.658 0.503 0.364
(0.0596) (0.0319) (0.0505)
0.758 0.520 0.550
(0.0432) (0.0400) (0.155)
0.701 0.565 0.461
(0.0799) (0.0569) (0.102)
0.785 0.629 0.430
(0.0800) (0.0451) (0.0999)
0.622 0.420 0.275
(0.0538) (0.0370) (0.0956)
0.660 0.419 0.298
(0.0918) (0.0570) (0.122)
0.601 0.445 0.269
(0.0694) (0.0352) (0.0599)
Trade cost controls Yes Yes Yes
Productivity level controls No Yes Yes
Comparative advantage controls No No Yes
Observations 181,923 181,923 181,923
R‐squared 0.580 0.701 0.726
F test innovation‐dependence equal across industries  (p‐value) 0.0218 0.000 0.0639
Average innovation‐dependence 0.619 0.455 0.311
Table 1: Innovation‐dependence by industry
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28)
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi‐trailers (29)
Other transport equipment (30)
Furniture, other manufacturing (3133)
Innovation‐dependence estimates
Estimates give innovation‐dependence relative to the shape parameter of the R&D capability distribution. Standard errors clustered by importer‐
industry in parentheses. Trade cost controls are exporter‐industry fixed effects and the interaction of industry dummy variables with six bilateral 
distance intervals and whether the countries share a border, a common language or a free trade agreeent. Productivity level controls are the 
importer's rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, voice and accountability, ease of 
doing business and log private credit as a share of GDP. Comparative advantage controls are the interaction of industry dummy variables with the 
importer's rule of law, log private credit as a share of GDP, log physical capital per employee and human capital. Sample includes 25 importers 
and 117 exporters and uses data for 2010‐14.
Rubber and plastics products (22)
Other non‐metallic mineral products (23)
Basic metals (24)
Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment (25)
Computer, electronic and optical products (26)
Electrical equipment (27)
Wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture (16)
Paper and paper products (17)
Printing and reproduction of recorded media (18)
Coke and refined petroleum products (19)
Chemicals and chemical products (20)
Basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical preparations (21)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing (0103)
Mining and quarrying (0508)
Food products, beverages and tobacco (1012)
Textiles (13)
Wearing apparel (14)
Leather and related products (15)
Baseline GDP per 
capita
Homogeneous 
innovation‐
dependence
Low trade 
elasticity
Moderate 
trade 
elasticity
High trade 
elasticity
Industry 
trade 
elasticities
(a) (b) (c)  (d) (e) (f) (g)
Elasticity 0.300 0.279 0.300 0.305 0.310 0.283 0.238
Standard deviation ratio 0.363 0.331 0.353 0.366 0.369 0.345 0.304
Elasticity 0.144 0.125 0.156 0.123 0.135 0.141 0.141
Standard deviation ratio 0.195 0.167 0.208 0.167 0.182 0.192 0.197
Average 0.316 0.277 0.295 0.340 0.324 0.306 0.379
Standard deviation 0.113 0.123 0.348 0.184 0.091 0.258
Correlation with baseline 0.924 0.848 0.945 0.974 0.548
(iv) Trade elasticity 6.53 6.53 6.53 2.5 4.5 8.5 Industry
Row (i) gives the elasticity of calibrated log wages to observed log nominal wages, and the ratio of the standard deviation of calibrated log wages to the standard deviation of observed log nominal wages. 
Row (ii) gives the same statistics for real income per capita. Row (iii) reports summary statistics on the innovation‐dependence estimates for goods industries used in the calibration. Correlation with 
baseline is the correlation with the baseline estimates used in column (a). Row (iv) shows the trade elasticity used in the calibration. Column (a) uses estimates from Table 1, column (c) to calibrate the 
model. For column (b) innovation‐dependence is estimated including the interaction of industry dummy variables with the importer's log GDP per capita as an additional control. In column (c) innovation‐
dependence is restricted to be the same in all goods industries. Industry‐specific trade elasticities used for column (g) from Caliendo and Parro (2015).
(i) Nominal wage
(ii) Real income per capita
(iii) Innovation‐dependence
Table 2: Calibration results
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